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Health and Welfare
Health and Welfare; anatomical gifts-donor liability
Health and Safety Code § 7155.5 (amended).
AB 2652 (Connolly); 1994 STAT. Ch. 160
Under existing law, designated persons may make anatomical gifts' to certain
entities upon the death of the donor.2 Under existing law, the individual making
the anatomical gift, and the individual's estate, may not be held liable for damage
or injury associated with the use of the anatomical gift.3 Under Chapter 160, the
estate or heirs of the person making the anatomical gift also will not be held liable
for the costs associated with harvesting the anatomical gift.4
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 160 is to preclude the billing of individuals who
make anatomical gifts or their heirs or estates for the costs associated with
harvesting the gift.5 Further, the author of Chapter 160 believes that the donee, or
his or her insurer, should bear the full costs associated with the donation and
receipt of the gift.6 It is believed that the failure to place the costs on the donee or
another party instead of the donor or his or her heirs would have a chilling effect
on future donations.7
Most states with anatomical gift laws similar to those of California have not
addressed the potential liability of heirs or estates of donors of anatomical gifts
for the costs associated with the organ donation! This may, in part, be due to
1. See CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 7150.1(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining an anatomical gift as
all or part of a human body donated upon or after death).
2. Id. § 7150.5 (Vest Supp. 1994); see id. § 7150.5(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing authorization
to persons over the age of 18 to designate their organs as anatomical gifts); id. § 7151 (West Supp. 1994)
(designating persons authorized to make anatomical gifts of another individual's organs); see also id. § 7153
(vest Supp. 1994) (listing entities which may be donees of anatomical gifts). But see id. § 7152 (West Supp.
1994) (prohibiting others from making an anatomieal gift of an organ when the donor's religious beliefs forbid
it).
3. Id. § 7155.5(d) (amended by Chapter 160).
4. Id.
5. ASSEhmLY FLOOR, ComrrrEm ANALYSIS OFAB 2652, at 2 (June 27, 1994); see id. (stating that the
author was concerned that persons who made anatomical gifts were billed large amounts of money for the costs
associated with harvesting the organs).
6. Id.
7. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2652, at 2 (June 14, 1994).
8. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-279j (West Supp. 1994); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327-11 (1993);
IDAHO CODE § 39-3412 (Michie 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525-9221 (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-17-207 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §451.582 (Michie 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-11 (1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-1 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5247 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
68.50.620 (West Supp. 1994) (immunizing donors and their estates from liability resulting from injury or
damage caused by the use of their anatomical gift). But see e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.50.60(a) (1993) (stating
that organ donors and their estates may not be held liable for the costs associated with organ procurement); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 194.233 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that hospitals may not be held liable for organ
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federal rules which allow for reimbursement of such costs to hospitals and organ
procurement organizations? by Medicare or Medicaid."0 It may also be because
it appears counter-intuitive to bill someone who has made a life-saving gift."I
The event which triggered Chapter 160, the billing of the family of a young
girl who donated several organs, was reportedly accidental and her family was not
required to pay the charges. 2 There have, however, reportedly been other
instances where donor families have received bills for the cost of the organ
procurement. 3 Although this may not be a regular occurrence, if people fear that
they or their heirs or estates will be billed for the costs, they may be less willing
to allow their organs to be donated. 4 With the large number of people on waiting
lists to receive organs, a decrease in organ donations could detrimentally affect
countless lives.'" Thus, to alleviate these fears, it is necessary to state clearly that
the donor or his or her estate or heirs may not be charged for the costs associated
with obtaining organs for transplant. 6 This amendment will result in the fair
allocation of organ procurement costs by placing the burden where it should
lie--on the person receiving the benefit of the organ transplant.
7
T Scott Belden
procurement costs).
9. See 42 C.F.R. § 485.302 (1993) (defining organ procurement organization); see also 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 273 (West Supp. 1994) (granting the Secretary of Health and Human Service the authority to establish and
provide grants to organ procurement organizations).
10. See 42 C.F.R. § 485.301 (1993) (allowing for payment of organ procurement costs by Medicare and
Medicaid).
11. See SENATE J DiCARY ComrmmrE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2652, at 2 (June 14, 1994)
(arguing that it is unfair to hold the donor's estate liable for the costs associated with harvesting the organs).
12. Lorie Hearn, Amid the Sorrow of Death, There's the Pain ofa Huge Bill: Bereaved Dad is Charged
for Organ Donation Costs, SAN DIEGo UNiON-TRiB:, Aug. 8, 1993, at B-I; see id. (quoting officials of the
procurement agency who stated that an administrative error caused the donor's family to receive a bill for the
costs).
13. ld.; see i. (stating that a 1991 survey disclosed that 10%-15% of survivors of organ donors in the
San Diego area had been charged for services that included organ procurement).
14. See id. (stating that the myth that donors will have to pay the costs of the procurement is a great
concern of organ donation officials); see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COlrrrEs ANALYSIS OFAB 2652, at 2 (June
27, 1994) (providing that donors and their estates should not have to bear the costs of organ procurement
because to do so would discourage persons from making donations).
15. See Hearn, supra note 12 (relating that in 1993, there were over 31,000 people on waiting lists in
the United States to receive organs).
16. See id. (relating that a great concern for officials involved in the organ donation program is
straightening out problems that could discourage people from signing donor cards).
17. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrrrEa ANALYSIS OF AB 2652, at 2 (June 27, 1994) (stating that donation
costs should be borne entirely by the organ recipient, donee, or the donee's insurer).
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Health and Welfare; care facilities-criminal history information of
applicant for licensure
Education Code § 8172 (amended); Health and Safety Code §§ 1555.1,
1568.0651, 1569.511, 1596.8871 (new); §§ 1522, 1568.09, 1569.17,
1596.871, 1596.877 (amended).
SB 1984 (Bergeson); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1267
Existing law regulates the licensing of persons operating, employed at, or
otherwise in contact with.clients of certain care facilities.' Under existing law,
the State Department of Social Services2 has the authority to contact an
appropriate law enforcement agency to determine whether a person seeking
licensure has been convicted3 of, or is currently awaiting trial for, a crime other
than a minor traffic violation.4
Chapter .1267 no longer requires the Department of Social Services to
ascertain whether a person seeking licensure is currently awaiting trial for certain
crimes,5 but instead must determine whether the person has ever been arrested for
the specified crimes.
6
Additionally, Chapter 1267 prohibits the Department of Social Services from
denying, revoking, or terminating any application or license for, or employment
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE §§ 1522, 1568.09, 1569.17, 1596.871 (amended by Chapter 1267);
see id. § 1522 (amended by Chapter 1267) (regulating community care facilities); id. § 1568.09 (amended by
Chapter 1267) (regulating residences for persons with chronic life-threatening illnesses); id. § 1569.17
(amended by Chapter 1267) (regulating facilities for the elderly); id. § 1596.871 (amended by Chapter 1267)
(regulating child day care facilities).
2. See CAL WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 10550-10618 (vest 1991 & Supp. 1994) (detailing the duties and
responsibilities of the State Department of Social Services).
3. See CAL PENAL CODE § 689 (West 1985) (specifying the manner of conviction); see also People
v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d. 370, 390-91, 348 P.2d 102, 116, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 683 (1960) (specifying that a
conviction will generally include a plea of guilty); Ex Parte Brown, 68 Cal. 176, 182, 8 P. 829, 832 (1885)
(stating that a conviction indicates a finding of a guilty verdict).
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1522(a), 1568.09(a), 1569.17(a), 1596.871(a) (amended by
Chapter 1267); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-87a (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-19.6 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.86 (Anderson 1994); Tx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.114 (vest 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389
(Michie 1994) (outlining similar criminal history reporting procedures).
5. See 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 888, sec. 1, at 3453-56 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1522); 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 937, sec. 1.5, at 3714-16 (amending CAL HEALTH & SAF Y CODE § 1522);
1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 888, sec. 4, at 3459-61 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1568.09); 1991
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 937, sec. 2.5, at 3718-20 (amending CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1568.09); 1993 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 526, sec. 1, at 2260-62 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1569.17); 1992 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 1113, sec. 2, at 4430-33 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.87 1).
6. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1522(a), 1568.09(a), 1569.17(a), 1596.871(a) (amended by
Chapter 1267); see id. §§ 1522(c)(4), 1568.09(c)(5), 1569.17(c)(5), 596.871(c)(4) (amended by Chapter 1267)
(exempting certain persons, if they can show that their criminal history indicates that they are of good
character); see also Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 864-65,553 P.2d 624,628, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464,
468 (1976) (holding that the interest in permitting law enforcement agencies to consult arrest records outweighs
the constitutional right to privacy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977). Contra Central Valley Chapter v.
Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d 145, 151,262 Cal. Rptr. 496,499 (1989), reh'g denied, (holding that dissemination
of arrest records for employment, licensing and certification purposes significantly affects a person's right to
privacy).
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or residence at, any care facility without first conducting an investigation of the
incident and securing evidence!
Existing law allows an individual to transfer a criminal record clearance from
one care facility to another In addition, prior law provided that for child care
facilities, the State Department of Social Services is required to hold the criminal
record clearances for a minimum of one year after an employee is no longer
employed at a licensed facility.' Chapter 1267 expands this requirement to now
require the Department to hold such records for all community care facilities,
residential care facilities for persons with a chronic life-threatening illness,
residential care facilities for the elderly, as well as child day care facilities for a
minimum of two years after the employee has no longer been employed at the
licensed facility."
Under existing law, proceedings may be held for the suspension, revocation,
or denial of a license to operate certain care facilities." Under Chapter 1267,
such proceedings are modified so that certain witnesses in some circumstances
may testify outside of the presence of the respondent.'2
In addition, existing law establishes a trustline registry for individuals
responsible for the care and supervision of children. 3 Chapter 1267 requires the
Department of Justice 4 to obtain specified information, including a criminal
record, if any, in order to enter a child care provider's name into the registry. 5
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
By providing for a closer examination of a care facility applicant's
background, Chapter 1267 is attempting to decrease the number of abuse
7. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1568.0651(e) (enacted by Chapter 1267), 1522(e), 1569.17(e),
1569.871(e) (amended by Chapter 1267).
8. Id. §§ 1522(h), 1568.09(g), 1569.17(g), 1596.871(h)(1) (amended by Chapter 1267); see id.
(indicating that the transfer must be processed through a state licensing district office and be transferred to
another state licensing district office).
9. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1113, sec. 2, at 4430-33 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1596.871).
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1522(h)(2), 1568.09(g)(2), 1569.17(g)(2), 1596.871(h)(2)
(amended by Chapter 1267).
11. Id. §§ 1551, 1568.065, 1569.51 (West Supp. 1994); id. § 1596.877 (amended by Chapter 1267).
12. Id §§ 1551.1, 1568.0651, 1569.511, 1596.8871 (enacted by Chapter 1267); see id. (indicating that
children or similarly vulnerable witnesses may testify outside the presence of the respondent if: (1) It is
necessary to ensure truthful testimony; (2) the witness is likely to be intimidated by the respondent's presence;
or (3) the witness is afraid to testify in front of the respondent).
13. Id. § 8172(a) (amended by Chapter 1267); see Ed Mendel, Wilson Signs Goich Billfor Child.Care
Registry, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRHm., Oct. 9, 1993, at A-20 (explaining that the Trustline Registry is a toll free
number available for parents to do background checks on care providers for their children); see also Can
Parents Trust Trustline?, Bus. W E, May 11, 1994, avaiilable in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File
(indicating that according to the Bay Area Nanny Agency Association (BANAA), children may still be at risk
even if the care provider clears Trustline).
14. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15000-15204 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (listing the duties and
responsibilities of the Department of Justice).
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8172(a) (amended by Chapter 1267).
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incidents occurring within the care facility system."6 In addition, Chapter 1267
facilitates testimony among vulnerable witnesses who may be swayed by the
presence of the respondent in a care facility suspension or revocation hearing.
7
Marnie L Smith
Health and Welfare; Cigarette and Tobacco Product Surtax Programs
Education Code § 49466 (new), §§ 49460, 49461, 49463, 49465
(amended); Health and Safety Code § 1189.105 (repealed and new), §§
424.10,424.20,424.30,424.40,424.55,424.60, 424.70,424.80,424.90,
424.97 (new and repealed), § 1189.107 (new), §§ 1189.101, 1189.103,
1189.109, 1189.113, 24162, 24163, 24164, 24167, 24168.6, 24168.7,
24168.8, 24169.8 (amended); Insurance Code §§ 12696.05, 12698,
12699, 12699.50, 12733 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §
16954 (repealed), § 16935.5 (new), §§ 14148.5, 14148.99, 16809.5,
16909, 16918, 16930, 16931, 16934.5, 16935, 16936, 16937, 16938,
16941.1, 16942, 16945, 16948, 16952, 16970, 16980, 16981, 16997.1
(amended).
AB 816 (Isenberg); 1994 STAT. Ch. 195
(Effective July 11, 1994)
16. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1984, at 4, (May 12, 1994); see id (indicating that
the Department of Social Services needs arrest information to conduct the extensive investigations of care
facility applicants); see also Peter Eisler, For Many, the Sin is Omission, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 1994, at 5A
(stating that in the United States, nursing home background checks are rare and reference checks ineffective);
Nursing Home Aide Screening Considered, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 3, 1994, at A3 (indicating that in the
United States, 20,000 to 30,000 nursing home aides have criminal records involving violence or theft).
17. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1984, at 6 (Apr. 19, 1994); see
SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1984, at 4, (May 12, 1994) (stating that administrative judges
did not have the authority to exclude spectators from hearings prior to Chapter 1267); see bIso Karen Femau,
Courts To Get Closed-Circuit TV Roomsfor Abuse Cases; Facilities Ease Trauma for Children Taking Stand,
PHOENIX GAzErTE, Nov. 1, 1993, at BI (illustrating that because some abuse victims are so overwhelmed by
the perpetrator's presence, they become confused or have gaps in their memory); Robin Topping, Overcoming
Obstacles In Child Abuse Cases, NEWSDAY, June 29, 1994, at A29 (indicating that in most child sex abuse
cases, children are reluctant to testify and in one instance the child testified with her back to the accused); cf.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50 (1990) (holding that a
face-to-face confrontation is not an indispensable element of the sixth amendment's guarantee to confront one's
accusers); Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children as Witnesses After Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL L.
REV. 1993, 1994-95 (1992) (finding that in th6 debate on whether the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant the right to a literal face-to-face confrontation with the accuser or whether it is to ensure that
evidence admitted in court will be reliable; the United States Supreme Court favored the latter).
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Under prior law, appropriations from the Cigarette and Tobacco Products
Surtax revenue generated by Proposition 99 which were distributed to the Health
Education, Hospital Services, Physician Services, and Unallocated accounts,
ceased as of July 1, 1994.2
Chapter 195 re-enacts and extends the sunset on these appropriations, as well
as the program authorizations which control the use of these funds, to July 1,
1996.? Furthermore, Chapter 195 re-authorizes the Research Account for tobacco-
related diseases,4 establishes the University of California as the coordinating
1. See The Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute--Cigarette and Tobacco Tax Benefit
Fund, Prop. 99, § 3 (codified at CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 12) (enacting Article XIIIB of the California
Constitution); id. § 4 (codified at CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE § 30122) (enacting the Cigarette and Tobacco
Products Surtax Fund); see also CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 30122(a)(1)-(4) (West 1994) (providing that the
revenue generated by the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund is to be directed toward tobacco-related
disease research and health education, health care for those otherwise unable to pay, and environmental
protection and conservation programs); id. § 30125 (West 1994) (allowing the funds created by this surtax to
be spent only for the purposes mentioned in California Revenue and Taxation Code § 30122); Kennedy
Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245,253-54, 806 P.2d 1360, 1366,279 Cal. Rptr. 325,
330-31 (1991) (ruling that voter initiative Proposition 99 did not violate the single-subject rule of the California
Constitution because all appropriations from the surtax would be in regard to the use of tobacco); id. (noting
that failure by the voters to specify exactly how spending would be directly relevant to tobacco-related
problems did not invalidate the measure).
2. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 278, sec. 2, at 1496-97 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1189.109); id. sec. 4, at 1497 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1189.113); id. sec. 11, at 1511
(amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24169.8); see id., sec. 2, at 1496-97 (amending CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1189.109); id. sec. 4, at 1497 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1189.113); id. sec.
11, at 1511 (amending CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24169.8) (declaring that the operative periods for these
sections were previously due to end July 1, 1994); see also 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1330, sec. 1, at 5376
(repealing CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 424.10-424.97) (establishing medical research programs that were
funded by the initiative which created the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax); 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch.
278, sec. 11.1, at 1517 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE § 12699.50) (listing the operative date for Insurance Code
sections dealing with the Access for Infants and Mothers Program).
3. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 424.97 (enacted and repealed by Chapter 195); id. § 1189.113
(amended by Chapter 195); id. § 24169.8 (amended by Chapter 195); CAL. INS. CODE § 12699.50 (amended
by Chapter 195); CAL. VELF. & INST. CODE § 14148.5(e) (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 14148.99 (amended
by Chapter 195); id. § 16809.5(e) (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 16997.1 (amended by Chapter 195); see
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 424.97 (enacted and repealed by Chapter 195); id. § 1189.113 (amended by
Chapter 195); id. § 24169.8 (amended by Chapter 195); CAL. INS. CODE § 12699.50 (amended by Chapter 195);
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 14148.5(e) (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 14148.99 (amended by Chapter 195);
id. § 16809.5(e) (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 16997.1 (amended by Chapter 195) (providing for an
automatic repeal of statutes on January 1, 1997 unless a later enacted statute further extends operational dates);
see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 424.10 (enacted by Chapter 195) (declaring legislative findings and
intent behind research programs created by the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax, such as a statewide
decline in tobacco consumption, a drop in revenue generated by the surtax due to the decline in consumption,
and the goal to fund only the most successful anti-smoking programs and activities); id. § 424.20 (enacted by
Chapter 195) (requesting the University of California to continue overseeing a grant program in the research
of tobacco-related diseases); id. § 424.70 (enacted by Chapter 195) (describing the University's responsibilities
as the agency in charge of tobacco-related disease programs); id. § 424.90 (enacted by Chapter 195) (stating
legislative intent that only 5% of the Research Account be used for administrative purposes); CAL. VeLF. &
INsT. CODE § 14148.5 (amended by Chapter 195) (providing state funded perinatal services to pregnant women
and children under one year of age under existing Medi-Cal and public health programs).
4. See CAL HEALTH & SAFEY CODE § 424.10(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 195) (ordering the research
programs to adhere to the 1988 initiative's goal of funding the research of tobacco-related disease).
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agency in regard to the standardized health assessment program of public school
children,5 and makes various changes to other surtax funded programs.6
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Essentially, Chapter 195 extends existing law in regard to Proposition 99
appropriations relating to health education in the area of tobacco dangers, health
and physician services for low-income and indigent persons, and research
conducted by the University of California into tobacco-related diseases!
The twenty-five cent excise tax on each pack of cigarettes created by
Proposition 99 was approved by state voters in November of 1988 to be used by
the state to fund the services mentioned above! Declarations made in regard to
smoking reflect the Legislature's goal to further research the diseases caused by
tobacco products,9 but it is also noted that in order to more accurately disburse
resources to deserving educational programs, the Legislature intends to determine
5. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 49460 (amended by Chapter 195) (including participation in the health
assessment by the State Departments of Education, Health Services, and Social Services, with further
contributions from California medical schools and the California State University).
6. Id. § 49460 (amended by Chapter 195); CAL. HEAI.TH & SAFETY CODE § 424.10 (enacted by
Chapter 195); Id. § 1189.101 (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 1189.105 (amended by Chapter 195); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14148.5 (amended by Chapter 195); see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49460 (amended by
Chapter 195) (establishing a standardized health assessment of California children); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1189.101 (establishing the Expanded Access to Primary Care Program); id. § 1189.105 (amended by
Chapter 195) (listing directives under the California Health Care for the Indigent Program for the State
Department of Health Services to conduct the reimbursement program for selected clinics which provide
medical attention to eligible recipients); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14148.5 (amended by Chapter 195)
(creating the Access for Infants and Mothers Program which provides state-funded perinatal care to pregnant
women and medical service to infants under one year of age as long as they meet financial eligibility
requirements).
7. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 424.97 (enacted and repealed by Chapter 195); id. § 1189.113
(amended by Chapter 195); id. § 24169.8 (amended by Chapter 195); CAL. INS. CODE § 12699.50 (amended
by Chapter 195); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 14148.5(e) (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 14148.99 (amended
by Chapter 195); id. § 16809.5(e) (amended by Chapter 195); id. § 16997.1 (amended by Chapter 195); see
SENATE FLOOR, COMrFTEE ANALYSIS oFAB 816, at 2 (May 5, 1994) (stating the applicable extensions of
existing law through AB 816).
8. The Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute-Cigarette and Tobacco Tax Benefit Fund,
Prop. 99, § 3 (codified at CAL CONST. art. XIIB, § 12) (enacting Article XIIIB of the California Constitution);
id. § 4 (codified at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 30122) (enacting the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax
Fund); see id. (enacting CAL. RE . & TAX. CODE § 30123) (authorizing a tax of $0.0125 upon each cigarette
sold); see also CAL REV. & TAx. CODE § 30122(b)(1)-(6) (West 1994) (distributing revenue collected for the
Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund to the following accounts: Health Education, Hospital Services,
Physician Services, Research, Public Resources, and an unallocated account to be used specifically for tobacco-
related education, disease research, health care for indigent persons, and environmental protection purposes);
SENATE FLOOR, CominTEE ANALYSiS oFAB 816, at 2 (May 5, 1994) (noting the purpose and authority of
Proposition 99).
9. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 424.10(b)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 195) (ordering the
University of California to administer over such research according to certain specified principles).
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which funded programs are actually contributing to the reduction of California
smokers."t
The enactment of Chapter 195 was embroiled in controversy due to
opposition that criticized the Legislature for diverting more Proposition 99 funds
to health-care programs for the indigent." Opponents claim that Proposition 99
appropriations are not meeting its directive that twenty percent be distributed to
health education, 2 and that the Legislature is simply ignoring a voter mandated
directive as to how the initiative's revenue is to be spent.'3 The reality behind the
10. Id.; see id. § 424.10(a)(5), (6) (enacted by Chapter 195) (stating declarations and findings of the
Legislature); cf. Paul Jacobs, Ex-Allies Feud Over Use of Smoking Tax, L.A. Timis, June 27, 1994, at Al
(citing Professor John P. Pierce, the person in charge of evaluating anti-smoking programs, in his conclusion
that anti-smoking advice given by doctors had ultimately no deterrent effect on the use of tobacco and his
recommendation that the $54 million program be abandoned); id. (quoting State Assemblymember Phillip
Isenberg in his complaint that there were no evaluations done to determine whether school district programs
that receive cigarette tax revenue had any deterrent effect on the use of tobacco); Sabin Russell, Stop.Smoking
Programs Feel Pinch, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1994, at Al (noting State Assemblymember Phillip lsenberg's
skepticism over the effectiveness of such anti-smoking programs as sponsoring race cars with anti-smoking
labels, grants to support tobacco-free skiing in the Sierra, and skits directed at young restaurant employees).
11. Stephen Green, Assembly OKs Smoking Curbs, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 8, 1994, at Al; see id.
(stating that along with the tobacco industry, doctors, hospitals, and poverty groups had also sought for more
funds to be distributed to low-income health care programs); see also Elaine Herscher, Actions of Smokers'
Rights GroupAre Questioned, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1993, at A13 (reporting that a Sacramento-based lobbying
group had been traversing California to force counties to account for funds received from the cigarette tax);
Jacobs, supra note 10 (discussing the debate over whether the State should increase spending on health care
for the poor at the expense of anti-smoking educational programs); Greg Lucas, Suit Questions Use of State
Fund, Money for Anti-Smoking Program Has Been Misspent, Groups Say, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 1994, at A19
(describing the lawsuit by Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights and the "Just Say No" To Tobacco Dough
Campaign against Governor Pete Wilson and the Legislature over the alleged improper diversion of over $35
million from anti-smoking educational funds to health-care programs for indigent children and pregnant
women); Russell, supra note 10 (noting the hostility and resentment involved in the debate over diverting
cigarette tax funds from educational programs to health-care programs); Debra J. Saunders, Make Smoke-Free
Pork-Free, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 1994, at A19 (criticizing those anti-smoking groups who are suing to halt
funding to health-care programs in need of much more financial support).
12. See Jacobs, supra note 10 (discussing the debate over the 20% of the cigarette tax that has been
allocated for educational purposes); id. (interviewing Mark Pertschuk from Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights,
and noting that their lawsuit against the state seeks $166 million which was allegedly diverted from educational
programs in an illegal manner); Lucas, supra note I 1 (reporting on the lawsuit filed against the Legislature and
Governor Pete Wilson over the alleged misallocation of Proposition 99 revenues and describing the dispute
over health-care providers receiving funds meant for educational purposes by simply warning against the
dangers of smoking while conducting certain medical services); cf. Sabin Russell, Battle Brewing Over Plan
for Tobacco Ta, Funds Would Be Shiftedfor Services to Poor, S.F. CHRON., July 29, 1992, at A21 (discussing
State budget problems and noting that previous budgetary negotiations had reduced the designated 20% of
cigarette tax revenue to only 14%); Saunders, supra note II (stating that due to California's recession, there
has not been one year since Proposition 99 was enacted that educational programs received the allotted 20%).
13. Green, supra note 11; see id. (noting State Senator Diane Watson's charge that the diversion of
educational funds was illegal and contrary to the purpose behind Proposition 99); see also Daniel M.
Weintraub, Heat Put on Wilson Over Anti-Smoking Funds, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1992, at A3 (reporting
accusations that Governor Pete Wilson was breaking the law by not distributing money designated for anti-
smoking advertisements). But see Green, supra note 11 (stating that every other year the Legislature is
authorized to revise the allocation of Proposition 99 funds); Jacobs, supra note 10 (discussing State
Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg's opinion that Proposition 99's provisions for revenue disbursement are
exceedingly strict).
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funding dispute is that California smokers are declining in number, and
accordingly, the tax revenue generated from the cigarette surtax is decreasing. 4
Sean P. Lafferty
Health and Welfare; county general assistance programs-extension of
provisions through 1996
Welfare and Institutions Code § 17001.5 (amended).
AB 1965 (Goldsmith); 1994 STAT. Ch. 952
Under existing law, each county is required to support all poor, incompetent,
indigent persons, and selected others, when those persons are not supported by
their own means, their relatives or friends, state hospitals, or other state or private
institutions through a county general assistance program.'
Prior law, which contained a clause revoking this provision on January 1,
1995, provided that each county was authorized to: adopt general assistance
residency requirements; discontinue general assistance benefits; and establish the
standard of general assistance for those applicants and recipients, who share
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 424.10 (enacted by Chapter 195); see id. § 424.10(a)(1) (enacted
by Chapter 195) (stating that although California has reduced its tobacco consumption, the State is not on pace
to meet its self-imposed 75% reduction goal by 1999); id. § 424.10(a)(2) (declaring that due to successful anti-
smoking educational programs, tobacco taxation has declined); id. (noting that the reduction in tobacco tax
revenue is an indication of the State's success, not an issue of concern); see also Bruce Bigelow, Anti-Tobacco
Forces Burning Mad Over Fund Plan, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRI., Feb. 3, 1992, at Al (noting that the number
of California adults who smoked had been reduced by 17% between 1987 and 1990); California in Brief
Cigarette Sales Drop as Tax Income Soars, L.A. TuMEs, June 28, 1990, at A30 (reporting that cigarette sales
had been reduced by 14% since the enactment of Proposition 99, a drop in dollar value from $2.54 billion in
1988 to $2.18 billion in 1989); Jacobs, supra note 10 (noting statewide decline in tobacco use); Lucas, supra
note 11 (stating that revenue expected to be generated from Proposition 99 for this fiscal year is at $440
million, down more than $160 million from that accumulated in 1989); Russell, supra note 10 (citing research
that demonstrates that since the enactment of tobacco education programs, California has lost 1 million
smokers, cut cigarette consumption by 1.1 billion packs, which depleted tobacco-industry sales by $1.5 billion,
and has saved California nearly $400 million in health care expenditures for tobacco-related diseases); id.
(suggesting that the success of the statewide goal to cut tobacco use is to blame for the budgetary crisis over
cigarette tax appropriations); id. (estimating that only $453 million in cigarette tax revenue will be generated
during the next fiscal year, less than half that generated during the first year of the tobacco surtax); Mark A.
Stein, Proposition 99 Cigarette Tax Hike; Tobacco Industry, Doctors Battle Over Prop. 99; Cigarette Tax
Measure Becomes Burning Issue, L.A. TMEas, Oct. 9, 1988, at 3 (suggesting that statistics gathered from other
states indicate that higher smoking prices will reduce the number of young smokers, as well as those just
starting to smoke).
1. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991); id. § 17000.5 (West Supp. 1994); see id.
(establishing the general assistance standard of aid); id. § 17001 (West 1991) (establishing standards of aid and
care); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.300 (1990) (defining the term assistance); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
74.04.005 (West Supp. 1994) (discussing eligibility for assistance).
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housing with one or more unrelated individuals, or with one or more persons who
are not legally responsible for the applicant or recipient of aid?
Chapter 952 extends these provisions until January 1, 1997. However,
Chapter 952 eliminates the authority for counties to establish a general assistance
standard for those recipients who share housing.4
Additionally, Chapter 952 requires the Legislative Analyst to conduct a study
on the impact of these residency and benefit revocation provisions.5
COMMENT
General assistance programs are designed to act as a safety net to provide
some minimal level of existence for the indigent.6 However, the applicable
assistance grant level may be limited to amounts provided under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Program Chapter 952 is intended to provide
uniformity between these assistance programs, thereby ensuring some "floor"
through which recipients will not be allowed to fall.'
Chapter 952 has its potential problems, specifically, the fifteen day residency
requirement used to evaluate an individual's eligibility for general assistance ?
This requirement could be interpreted by the courts as impacting upon the right
of all citizens to migrate freely throughout the United States, without that
2. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 719, sec. 14, at 2887-88 (enacting CAL. W/ELF. & INST. CODE § 17001,5); see
Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, 11 Cal. App. 4th 535, 542-43, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 186-87 (1992)
(stating that the county may apply family unit aid ratios, used in the federal poverty line, to general assistance
aid given to unrelated persons living in shared housing without first conducting a Boehm study of minimum
subsistence needs, as long as the reductions did not exceed the percentages set forth).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001.5(c) (amended by Chapter 952).
4. Compare 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 719, sec. 14, at 2887-88 (enacting CAL. NViEL. & INST. CODE §
17001.5) (establishing the authority to impose general assistance standards for those recipients who share
housing) with CAL. WEuF. & INST. CODE § 17001.5 (amended by Chapter 952) (deleting language that
established such authority).
5. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001.5(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 952); see id. § 17001.5(b)(2)
(amended by Chapter 952) (stating that the evaluation must include: (1) An analysis of the impact of California
Welfare and Institutions Code § 17001.5 on the extent of honelessness for those who are applicants of general
assistance programs; (2) consideration of the rate at which recipients of general assistance are sanctioned by
county welfare departments; and (3) a study of the impact of the 15-day residency requirement on both
applicants and recipientg of general assistance, including how often the requirement is invoked); id. §
17001.5(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 952) (requiring, while conducting the study, the Legislative Analyst to
consult with the State Department of Social Services, the County Welfare Directors Association, and various
other organizations that advocate on behalf of those recipients on public assistance).
6. ASSEMBLY COmm=rON HUM ANREsOURcES, COMMrmANALYSlS OF AB 1965, at 2 (May 19,
1994).
7. Id.; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11200-11517.2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (outlining every
facet of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program).
8. ASSEMBLY COMMrTEE ON HUMAN RESOuRCES, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1965, at 2 (May 19,
1994).
9. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001.5(a)(1)(A) (amended by Chapter 952); cf. ME., Ruv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 4307(3) (West 1992) (declaring that the use of durational residency requirements for the evaluation
of general assistance is strictly prohibited). But cf WiS. STAT. ANN. § 49.015(1)(b) (West Supp. 1993) (stating
that before an individual is eligible to receive assistance, that person must reside in the state for 60 consecutive
days).
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migration being inhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations."° When evaluating the
constitutionality of the residency provisions we must examine the intent behind
the invocation of the requirement." In Shapiro v. Thompson, 2 the Supreme Court
struck down a District of Columbia statutory provision under which persons who
had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least one year immediately
proceeding their applications were denied welfare assistance. 3 The Court held
that the statutory prohibition on welfare benefits during that one-year period
created a classification that constituted discrimination because it denied those
individuals equal protection under the law. 4 This holding has been followed
religiously in subsequent decisions in which the Court struck down similar
residency requirements of states which claimed that the residency requirement
was needed to conserve scarce economic resources. 5 Specifically, in Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County,'6 the Court stated that "[tihe conservation of the
taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational
residence requirement which, in effect, severely penalizes exercise of the right to
freely migrate and settle in another State."' 7 Thus, the rule is clearly established
that a State may not enact a residency requirement for general assistance with the
intent of discouraging outsiders from relocating to the state.'8
Thus, the question of when a State may impose a residency requirement is a
source of much debate.'9 To date, the United State Supreme Court has on only
10. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
11. See id. at 631 (specifying that "[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek
higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally."). Thus, the Court rejected a state's
economic rationale as sufficient cause for implementing such residency requirements before the issuance of
public assistance could be granted. Id.
12. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
13. Id. at 627-29.
14. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that no State shall deprive any person within its
jurisdiction of equal protection under the laws).
15. See Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 911 (1986) (striking down a statute giving civil
service preference to current resident veterans who were also residents of New York at the time they entered
military service and stating that even if the purpose behind the residency requirement is to conserve state funds,
such a purpose, though laudable, is still unconstitutional); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
269-70 (1974) (invalidating an Arizona statute requiring one-year residence in-county as a condition to
receiving non-emergency medical care at the county's expense). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410
(1975) (holding that the State's one-year residency requirement for out-of-state petitioners seeking a divorce
decree is constitutional).
16. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
17. Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 263.
18. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898; Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250; Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
19. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516,521 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (reasoning that given the increase
in the cost of living in California as compared with other states, providing newcomers with the same amount
of welfare assistance that they received in their previous state of residence has the same impact as totally
denying the newcomers access to aid); Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W. 2d 198, 203 (Minn. 1993) (holding that
a state residency requirement of six months before allowing an individual to receive full welfare benefits
burdens one's fundamental right to travel within the Union, and that the state's argument of conserving limited
economic resources is not a compelling one), cert. denied Steffen v. Mitchell, 114 S.Ct. 902 (1994); see also
High Court Rejects Welfare Limits On New Residents, DALtAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 1994, at 4A
(discussing a case in which the United States Supreme Court refused to grant review, Steffen v. Mitchell, which
held that it is unconstitutional for states to give less welfare assistance to people who relocate from other
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one occasion upheld a durational residency requirement.20 In Sosna v. Iowa2' a
statute provided that out-of-state residents must have lived in the state for at least
one year before they are allowed to seek a divorce decree. 22 There, the Court held
that the State's interest in regulating domestic relations and protecting its divorce
decrees from collateral attack was materially greater than the budgetary and
recordkeeping interests advanced in Shapiro and Maricopa.
23
Thus, in order for Chapter 952 to withstand a constitutional attack, it must
further some compelling state interest beyond a desire to simply discourage an
influx of indigent persons.24 While most of the case law on the subject concerns
residency requirements of one year, similar provisions that advocate shorter
residency requirements have been upheld.25 In Jones v. Milwaukee County,26 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, upheld a sixty day residency requirement on the
grounds that the sixty day deprivation of welfare benefits was "substantially less
onerous" than a denial for an entire year.27 However, this seems to be in direct
conflict with the Shapiro line of cases in that newcomers were being "denied
welfare aid upon which may depend the ability.., to obtain the very means to
subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life." Thus, while residency
requirements are allowable in Wisconsin, the very principal of protecting the right
of interstate migration would lead one to believe that the Jones holding may be
overturned if challenged. 29
In the recently decided case of Green v. Anderson,3" the court struck down a
California statute which required that an individual reside in the state for twelve
consecutive months before he or she is eligible to receive the full amount of
states); Reynolds Holding, Welfare Limit for Newcomers Struck Down; Law Proposed by Wilson had been on
Holdfora Year, S.F. CHRON., May4, 1994, at Al (discussing Green v. Anderson where a federal appeals court
ruled that California could not limit welfare benefits for newcomers to the state). See generally Clark Allen
Peterson, Comment, The Resurgence of Durational Residence Requirements for the Receipt of Welfare Funds,
27 Loy. LA. L. REv. 305 (1993) (discussing the constitutionality of residency requirements); Matthew Poppe,
Comment, Defining the Scope of the Equal Protection Clause with Respect to Welfare Waiting Periods, 61 U.
CHi. L. REV. 291 (1994) (examining the constitutionality of residency requirements).
20. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,410 (1975).
21. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 409.
24. Soto.Lopez, 476 U.S. 898; Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250; Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618; Green, 811 F. Supp.
at 521-23. See generally Peterson, supra note 19 (discussing the constitutionality of residency requirements
and the state interest behind their creation); Poppe, supra note 19 (examining the constitutionality of residency
requirements and state interest behind their creation).
25. See Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992) (discussing the constitutionality of
Wisconsin's 60-day residency requirement, and holding that it was in fact constitutional).
26. 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).
27. Id. at 26.
28. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
29. See id (indicating the Court's vehement protection of the right of interstate migration); Maricopa,
415 U.S. at 256-61 (supporting the Court's vehement protection of the right of interstate migration first set
forth in Shapiro).
30. 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
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public assistance that a California resident receives."a In Green, the court followed
the Shapiro line of cases holding the California provision to be unconstitutional
claiming that it placed a penalty on migration, and denied one prompt access to
the necessities of life. 32
However, given that Chapter 952 advocates a possible, not mandatory,
residency requirement for the "purposes of determining a person's eligibility for
general assistance," and given that any residency requirement "shall not exceed
fifteen days," there is a strong indication that the motivation of the California
Legislature is to simply facilitate the processing of general assistance claims, and
not to deter interstate migration.33 Thus, in the event of a possible constitutional
challenge, the State would simply have to argue that the rather minimal residency
period is necessary to effectively process the claims, and that it is not an effort to
discourage the migration of indigent persons to the State.' This would meet the
test of satisfying the need for a compelling state interest while not depriving
individuals of the necessities of life, especially since Chapter 952's fifteen day
requirement is significantly shorter than the previously overturned one year
provisions as well as Wisconsin's sixty-day residency requirement.
35
Furthermore, the legislative intent of effectively processing claims as opposed to
deterring migration can be inferred from the fact that Chapter 952 requires a study
of the impact of the fifteen day residency requirement. 36 Given the recognized test
31. Green, 811 F. Supp. 516,523 (E.D. Cal. 1993); see id. at 521 (stating that given the increase in the
cost of living in California as compared with other states, providing newcomers with the same amount of
welfare assistance that they received in their previous state of residence has the same impact as totally denying
the newcomers access to aid); see also Strong v. Collatos, 593 F.2d 420,423 (lst. Cir. 1979) (stating that the
provisions of a Massachusetts statute creating a durational residency requirement as a condition for veterans
to receive their welfare benefits, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bums
v. Montgomery, 299 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (granting an injunction against the enforcement
of a residency requirement which raised questions regarding the constitutionality of the residency provision,
where the plaintiffs were likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm if preliminary relief were withheld),
aft'd, Montgomery v. Bums, 394 U.S. 848 (1969).
32. Green, 811 F. Supp. at 523.
33. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001.5(a)(1)(A) (amended by Chapter 952).
34. See Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 256-61 (stating that in determining whether a residency requirement
impinges on the right to travel in an unconstitutional manner, it must be considered whether the waiting period
would deter migration and the extent to which the residence requirement serves to penalize those who choose
to exercise their right to travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (stating that unless the law has a legitimate and
significant state purpose, if it acts to deter migration, it is patently unconstitutional); Green, 811 F. Supp. at
521-23 (stating that in order for California's residency requirement to be upheld as constitutional, the State
must present some compelling state interest).
35. See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904 (stating that a court must first determine whether the statute
operates to penalize those persons who have exercised their right to migrate; if it does, the statute must fail
unless the State can demonstrate that its classification is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest);
id. at 907 (noting that "even temporary deprivation of very important benefits and rights can operate to penalize
migration").
36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001.5(b)(1)(C) (amended by Chapter 952).
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set forth in cases like Shapiro and Maricopa it seems that Chapter 952 would be
able to successfully withstand a constitutional challenge 7
Christian A. Amer!
Health and Welfare; day care providers-training modifications
Health and Safety Code §§ 1797.113, 1797.191 (new); § 1596.866
(amended).
AB 243 (Alpert); 1994 STAT. Ch. 246
(Effective July 21, 1994)
Existing law requires that at least one teacher or director in a child day care
facility' and each family day care home2 provider3 have at least fifteen hours of
prescribed preventative health training.4 Existing law also requires at least one
person with training in first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to be
37. Soto-Lopez. 476 U.S. 898; Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250; Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618. See generally Peterson,
supra note 19 (discussing the constitutionality of residency requirements and the state interest behind their
creation); Poppe, supra note 19 (discussing the constitutionality of residency requirements and the state interest
behind their creation).
1. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.750 (West 1990) (defining a child day care facility as
a facility providing nonmedical care and supervision for less than a 24-hour period to children under 18 years
of age).
2. See id. § 1596.78 (West 1990) (defining a family day care home as a private residence which
provides care for less than a 24-hour period to less than 12 children).
3. See id. § 1596.791 (West 1990) (defining a provider as a person licensed to operate a child day care
facility).
4. Id. § 1596.866(a) (amended by Chapter 246); see id. (specifying that the training must include
pediatric cardiopulmonary resuscitation, pediatric first aid, recognition, management, and prevention of
infectious diseases, including immunizations, and prevention of childhood injuries); cf. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 390-a(3)(b) (McKinney 1992) (requiring that facility operators have an initial 15 hours of training and an
additional 15 hours biannually in prescribed areas). See generally Hal Mattern, The Search, AM.IZ. REPuBuc,
June 12, 1994, at FI (outlining parental concerns with child day care centers and discussing the questions
parents should ask, including whether all proper training requirements have been met); Parents Urged to Check
Up on Child Day-Care Services, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 12, 1994, at N8 (urging parents to make sure that
caregivers have completed training that exceeds the minimum requirements).
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at the child day care facility at all times when children are present at the facility.5
Under existing law, the fulfillment of the training requirements may be
demonstrated by showing cards issued by either the American Red Cross (ARC)
or the American Heart Association (AHA).6
Prior law required at least four hours of pediatric CPR training, eight hours
of pediatric first aid training, and three hours of preventative health practices
training.7 Chapter 246 eliminates the minimum hour breakdowns while retaining
the fifteen hours minimum total preventative health training requirement.8 Chapter
246 requires that a day care director provide for at least one person with proper
training in first aid and CPR to be available when the children are offsite on a
facility related activity.9 It further requires that a large family day care home'0
licensee also see that one such person is available on the site when children are
present and when the children are offsite for care related activities."
Chapter 246 requires that family day care home licensees who provide care,
as well as day care center personnel, maintain current pediatric CPR and first aid
cards.' 2 Chapter 246 allows for pediatric CPR and first aid certification cards to
be issued by, in addition to the ARC and AHA, any training program approved
by the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA).' 3 The EMSA must create
a process for continual review of training programs and is required to charge fees
for the programs in order to offset costs.'
4
5. CAL. HFALTH& SAMY CODE § 1596.866(b) (amended by Chapter 246); see id. (requiring that such
training be proven by a certificate issued by a training program approved by the Emergency Medical Services
Authority according to §§ 1596.866 and 1797.191 of the California Health and Safety Code); cf. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 402.305(7)(a) (West 1993) (requiring that when children are present at the facility at least one present
staff member must be trained in pediatric CPR); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 1017(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(requiring that at least one staff member certified in first aid, the Heimlich maneuver, and CPR be on the
premises during business hours).
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.866 (d)(1) (amended by Chapter 246).
7. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 35, sec. 1, at 113 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1596.866(a)).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.866(a) (amended by Chapter 246); see id. (stating that
preventative health training may include the areas of food handling, child nutrition, caring for children with
special needs, recognition of child abuse, and preparedness for emergencies); see also id. § 1596.866(e)
(amended by Chapter 246) (providing that such training may be provided through on-the-job training,
workshops, or classes, but not by a home study course).
9. Id. § 1596.866(b) (amended by Chapter 246).
10. See id. § 1596.78(a) (vest 1990) (defining a large family day care home as a private residence
which provides care for 7 to 12 children including children under 10 years of age residing in the home).
11. Id. § 1596.866(b) (amended by Chapter 246).
12. Id. § 1596.866(f) (amended by Chapter 246); see id. (requiring that the cards be maintained in
accordance with California Health and Safety Code § 1596.866(d)).
13. Id. § 1596.866(d) (amended by Chapter 246); see id. § 1797.191(a) (enacted by Chapter 246)
(establishing the necessity for minimum approval standards for pediatric CPR and first aid); cf. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 402.305(7)(a) (West 1993) (allowing pediatric CPR training to be provided by a course approved by
the American Heart Association); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 1017(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (allowing
certification to be given by the American Red Cross or any other approved organization).
14. CAL HEALTH & SAFEY CODE § 1797.191(b) (enacted by Chapter246); see id. § 1797.113 (enacted
by Chapter 246) (creating the Emergency Medical Services Training Program Approval Fund for the repository
of paid fees).
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Existing law mandates that all required training be completed on or before
January 1, 1995, as a condition of licensure. 5 Chapter 246 provides that a notice
of deficiency will be issued to any licensee who has not met the training
requirements. t6 Chapter 246 also provides that the training requirement will be
deemed met if the person, prior to July 1, 1994, has a certificate from a program
which is subsequently approved by the EMSA.1
7
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
By enacting Chapter 246 and allowing for training programs other than those
of the AHA and the ARC, the Legislature is attempting to compensate for an
anticipated rush of day care providers wishing to be licensed for pediatric CPR
and first aid before the January 1, 1995, deadline.' 8 Such a demand cannot be
fulfilled entirely by the AHA and the ARC. Therefore, many licensed day care
facilities would be in high risk of being closed merely because they are not able
to have their staff trained in alternative programs. t9
Mark E. Bellamy
Health and Welfare; Disaster Housing Repair Fund-consideration of
annual family income
Health and Safety Code § 50662.7 (amended).
SB 110 (Campbell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 96
Existing law provides for the California Disaster Housing Repair Fund,
which is administered by the Department of Housing and Community
Development.2 Existing law specifies that money in this fund be continuously
appropriated for making deferred-payment loans to provide funding for the repair
15. Id. § 1596.866(c) (amended by Chapter 246).
16. Id. § 1596.866(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 246); see id. (requiring that a licensee in receipt of a
notice of deficiency develop a plan to correct the deficiency within 90 days of receipt of the notice); see also
id. (providing that the facility's license may be revoked if it fails to correct the deficiency within 90 days).
17. Id. § 1797.191(d) (enacted by Chapter 246).
18. SENATE RULES CoMMrnEE, COMMrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 243, at 3-4 (May 4, 1994).
19. Id.
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50661.5(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1994) (establishing the Disaster
Housing Repair Fund).
2. Id. §§ 50400-50408 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (providing the organization and general powers of
the Department of Housing and Community Development).
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of housing damaged or destroyed by natural disaster.3 Prior law prohibited the
Department from considering individual or family income when determining
eligibility for a loan from the fund.4 Chapter 96 rescinds this prohibition and
prohibits the Department, when allocating grants and loans, from providing a loan
to a family with an annual income in excess of 150% of statewide median
income.5
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The 150% cap was implemented by Chapter 96 because some legislators
wanted to reduce the state's expenditure from the California Disaster Assistance
Program.6
Cary G. Hipps
Health and Welfare; emergency homeless shelters-state armories
Government Code §§ 15301, 15301.3, 15301.5, 15301.7 (new).
AB 1808 (Areias); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1195
Existing law empowers the Adjutant General,' under the direction of the
3. Id. § 50662.7 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (declaring that the purpose of the fund is to provide
disaster relief to the owners of owner-occupied dwellings); see also id. § 50661.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994)
(stating that the money in the fund is also continually appropriated for predevelopment loans); id. §
50661.5(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that one of the purposes of the fund is to provide loan guarantees for
the disaster-related loans made by private institutional lending sources). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §
8680.3 (West 1992) (defining natural disaster as fire, flood, storm, tidal wave, earthquake, or other similar
public calamity resulting from natural causes or, in the case of fire which the Governor determines presents
a threat to public safety, by manmade causes); Paul Feldman & Rich Connell, Relocation Is Bad News For
Some, Good For Others, L.A. Taw s, Feb. 5, 1994, at Al (stating that applicants must first exhaust insurance
and all other state and federal disaster assistance to qualify for the low-interest, deferred payment loans from
the Disaster Housing Repair Fund); id. (describing vouchers and other forms of assistance available to disaster
victims).
4. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 966, see. 5, at 3953 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
50662.7).
5. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50662.7(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 96); see id. (requiring that the
annual income used in this determination be adjusted for family size).
6. CoNFERENCOszsffrrr, COMMiTrEEREPoRT ON SB 110, at 2 (May 19,1994); see id. at 1-2 (May
19, 1994) (stating that the California Disaster Assistance Program is one of the largest housing programs that
the State Department of Housing and Community Development administers, and that there have been 12
disasters which required $200 million of funds to assist in rehabilitating and rebuilding damaged housing from
the program since its inception).
1. See CAL Ma- & VET. CODE § 160 (West 1988) (defining Adjutant General as the chief of staff to
the Governor, subordinate only to him, and as the commander of all state military forces).
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Governor,2 to make and enforce regulations for the government and control of
state armories' for use by the state militia.4 Existing law authorizes the Adjutant
General to appoint a Community Advisory Committee to advise the Adjutant
General on the use of state armories as shelters for the homeless.6
Chapter 1195 requires specified state armories7 to be made available to
certain cities and counties8 for use by homeless persons for emergency shelter
purposes during the period from December 1 through March 15 each year, as a
temporary measure until March 15, 1997. However, Chapter 1195 also mandates
that if severe weather conditions exist between November 1 through March 31,
the Military Department may extend the use of the armories to include November
1 to December 1 and March 15 to March 31.0
Chapter 1195 requires participating counties and cities, in consultation with
the Community Advisory Committee or, if no committee has been appointed, in
consultation with the Adjutant General, to obtain from the Military Department"
a license to operate state armories as emergency shelters for homeless persons., 2
Chapter 1195 requires a city or county electing to use a state armory as a
homeless shelter to provide a report to the Department of Economic Opportunity 13
describing progress toward a long range, permanent shelter plan for homeless
persons to take effect on March 15, 1997. t" Furthermore, Chapter 1195 requires
2. See id. § 140 (West 1988) (stating that the Governor is the commander-in-chief of the state militia
by virtue of his office).
3. See id. § 430 (West 1988) (defining armory as any building or portion thereof, rifle range, camp,
airport, arsenal, vessel, quarters, accommodations, or training facilities devoted to the use of the militia).
4. Id. § 434 (West 1988); see id. § 120 (West 1988) (defining state militia as the National Guard, State
Military Reserve, and the Naval Militia constituting the active and the unorganized militia).
5. See id. § 438(b) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that the Community Advisory Committee must include
representation from cities, counties, and organizations or associations that represent the interests of homeless
persons).
6. Id. § 438(c) (West Supp. 1994).
7. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 15301 (enacted by Chapter 1195) (listing the armories subject to the
provisions of Chapter 1195).
8. See id. § 15301 (enacted by Chapter 1195) (listing the cities and counties that may utilize the
specified armories).
9. Id.; see id. (stating that Chapter 1195 is a temporary measure designed to allow government entities
adequate time to develop other suitable homeless shelter arrangements).
10. Id.
11. See CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 50 (West 1988) (establishing the Military Department).
12. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 15301.3 (enacted by Chapter 1195); see id. § 15301.3(a)-(d) (enacted by
Chapter 1195) (mandating that the following requirements apply to any city or county obtaining a license for
the use of state armories as homeless shelters: (1) The county or city obtaining a license must be solely
responsible for measures and costs required to comply with state and local health and safety codes during the
license period; (2) the county or city obtaining the license must be responsible for all legal liabilities during
the license periods and the state must be held harmless in each case; (3) the county or city obtaining a license
must be responsible for all costs of providing shelter in the state armory or armories to homeless persons during
the license periods; (4) the county or city obtaining a license must be solely responsible for alternative housing
arrangements for homeless persons housed in state armories during the license periods, upon notification from
the Military Department that the armory or armories will be required for military activities or emergency
purposes as announced by the Governor).
13. See id. § 12085 (West 1992) (establishing the Department of Economic Opportunity).
14. Id. § 15301.5 (enacted by Chapter 1195).
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the Military Department, the Department of Economic Opportunity, the
Department of Housing and Community Development, 5 and a representative of
participating cities and counties to prepare an evaluation of the temporary armory
shelter program and to report to the Governor and Legislature prior to March 15,
1997.16
INThRPRETIvE COMMENT
Chapter 1195 was enacted as a response to the growing need for emergency
shelters throughout California during the harsh winter months. 7 Although
armories have been used in the past as homeless shelters, they were used only on
a temporary basis. 8 Chapter 1195 extends the use of state armories to shelter the
homeless until March 15, 1997.29
Lisa R. Brenner
Health and Welfare; family home care-developmentally disabled adults
Health and Safety Code § 1505 (amended); Welfare and Institutions
Code §§ 4689.1, 4689.2, 4689.3, 4689.4, 4689.5, 4689.6 (new); §§
4475, 4476, 4477, 4478, 4535 (amended).
SB 1730 (Russell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1095
(Effective September 29, 1994)
15. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50400 (West 1986) (creating the Department of Housing and
Community Development and placing it within the Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency).
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15301.7 (enacted by Chapter 1195).
17. SENATEFLOOR, COMrrEEANALYSiS OFAB 1808, at 2 (May 5, 1994); seeJake Henshaw, Gannett
News Service, June 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Newi Library, Cumws File (stating that using the armories
as emergency shelters enables local governments to work in cooperation with the state to provide very cost-
effective winter overflow shelter); see also Recessions Pushes up Demand for Homeless Shelters, Reuter World
Service, Dec. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (reporting that California state shelters
turn away hundreds of homeless because of a lack of facilities).
18. See SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1808, at 2 (May 5, 1994) (stating that Governor
Deukmejian in 1987 started the National Guard Temporary Shelter Program whereby armories were opened
on evenings when the weather was extremely harsh, and that last year, Governor Wilson expanded the program
to a 90-day continuous program, during which the armories were open at night regardless of weather conditions
during the winter weather months); see also Gannett News Service, supra note 17 (stating that the National
Guard Temporary Shelter Program is set to expire on July 1, 1995).
19. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrrEE ANALYSiS OF AB 1808, at 1 (Aug. 31, 1994).
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Existing law, the California Community Facilities Act,' requires community
care facilities2 to be licensed by the State Department of Social Services' Existing
law also specifies facilities which are exempt from licensure under the California
Community Facilities Act.4 Chapter 1095 expands the list of exempted facilities
to include family homes5 and family home agencies involved with develop-
mentally disabled adults.7
Chapter 1095 establishes family homes as a new residential treatment option
for adults with developmental disabilities Chapter 1095 further requires that the
State Department of Developmental Services develop regulations for these
settings to foster high quality services which provide support and promote
inclusion in community life for developmentally disabled adults.' Chapter 1095
1. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1500 (West 1990) (establishing the California Community
Care Facilities Act).
2. See id. § 1502(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining community care facility as any facility, place, or
building which is maintained and operated to provide non-medical residential care, day treatment, adult day
care, or foster family agency services for children, adults, children and adults, including but not limited to, the
physically handicapped, mentally impaired, incompetent persons, and abused or neglected children),
3. Id. § 1508 (West 1990); see id. § 1503 (West 1990) (requiring a license to operate a community care
facility); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10550 (West 1991) (creating the State Department of Social
Services within the Health and Welfare Agency).
4. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1505 (amended by Chapter 1095); see id. (specifying that the
California Community Care Facilities Act does not apply to the following: (1) Health facilities; (2) clinics; (3)
specified juvenile placement facilities; (4) child day care facilities; (5) specified facilities conducted by and
for religious adherents which depend on prayer and spiritual means for healing of the sick; (6) school
dormitories; (7) places which supply only room and board; (8) alcohol and drug abuse recovery facilities; and
(9) arrangement by family and friends to care for a person if the arrangement is not for financial profit and
occurs only occasionally and irregularly).
5. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4689.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 1095) (defining family home as a
home that is owned, leased, or rented by, and is the family residence of, the family home providers, and in
which support and services are provided to no more than two adults with developmental disabilities who do
not require continuous skilled nursing care).
6. See id. § 4689.1(c) (enacted by Chapter 1095) (defining family home agency as a private not-for-
profit agency that is vendored to do all of the following: (1) Recruit, approve, train, and monitor family home
providers; (2) provide social services and in-home support to family home providers; (3) assist adults with
developmental disabilities in moving into approved family homes).
7. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1505(m) (amended by Chapter 1095); see CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 4512(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining developmental disability as a disability that originates before an
individual attains the age of 18, continues, or can be expected to continue indefinitely, and constitutes a
substantial disability for that individual including: mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism).
8. CAL. WEI . & INST. CODE § 4689.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 1095); see SENATE FLOot, Co M1rrTE
ANALYSIS oFSB 1730, at I (May 19, 1994) (stating that adult family home agencies are a new option for adults
with developmental disabilities).
9. CAL. WELa & INST. CODE § 4689.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 1095); see id. § 4689.1(d)(1)-(1 1)
(enacted by Chapter 1095) (requiring the State Department of Developmental Services to promulgate standards
and requirements related to, but not limited to, all of the following: (1) Specified selection criteria for regional
centers to apply in vendoring family home agencies; (2) vendorization; (3) specific areas related to operation
of family home agencies; (4) program design; (5) program and consumer records; (6) family homes; (7) rates
of payment for family home agencies and approved family home providers, which cannot exceed rates for
similar individuals residing in other out-of home settings; (8) monitoring and evaluation designed to ensure
the family homes and family home agency are achieving specific levels of service; (9) monthly monitoring
visits by family home agency social service staff to approved family homes; (10) procedures to enforce
applicable laws and regulations, investigate allegations of abuse or neglect, and impose sanctions on the family
home agencies and approved family homes; and (11) appeal procedures); see also id. § 4689.1(d)(8)(A)-(F)
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declares that adults with developmental disabilities placed in a family home have
specified rights.1
0
Chapter 1095 requires the filing of fingerprints of individuals who will have
contact with consumers receiving services from family home agencies and family
homes, and requires a criminal background check on these persons.'" In addition,
Chapter 1095 prohibits persons with specified types of criminal convictions from
providing or being connected to the provision of services in family homes or
family home agencies without an issued exemption. 2
Existing law provides that developmental centers are under the jurisdiction
of the State Department of Developmental Services. 3 Prior law mandated that
each developmental center have a developmental center advisory board of seven
members.' 4 Chapter 1095 expands this number to eight members.15
Existing law directs the State Council on Developmental Disabilities to
perform various duties in the development and review of services and programs
(enacted by Chapter 1095) (requiring that the monitoring and evaluation be designed to ensure that the services
do all of the following: (1) Conform to law and regulations and provide for the consumer's well-being; (2)
assist the consumer in understanding and exercising his or her individual rights; (3) remain consistent with the
family home agency's program design and the consumer's individual program plan; (4) maximize the
consumer's opportunities to have choices involving where he or she lives, works, and socializes; (5) provide
a 24-hour a day supportive family home environment that is clean, comfortable, and accommodating to the
customer's culture, values, and lifestyle; and (6) satisfy the consumer).
10. Id § 4689.1(0 (enacted by Chapter 1095); see id (providing that such adults have at least the rights
specified in California Welfare and Institutions Code § 4503); see also id. § 4503 (West Supp. 1994) (listing
these rights as: (1) To wear his or her own clothes, keep and use his or her own personal possessions, and to
keep and be allowed to spend a reasonable amount of his or her own money for small purchases; (2) to have
access to individual storage space for his or her private use; (3) to see visitors each day; (4) to have ready
access to letter writing materials and to receive unopened correspondence; (5) to refuse electroconvulsive
therapy; (6) to refuse behavior modification techniques which cause pain or trauma; (7) to refuse specified
psychosurgery; (8) to make choices in areas including, but not limited to, his or her daily living routines, choice
of companions, leisure and social activities and program planning and implementation; and (9) other rights
specified by regulation).
11. Id § 4689.2(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 1095); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1522(a) (West
Supp. 1994) (providing that persons operating or managing a community care facility must submit fingerprints
for a criminal record check); see also id. § 1569.17(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that persons who operate
or manage a residential care facility for the elderly must submit fingerprints for a criminal record check).
12. CAL WEL. & INST. CODE § 4689.2(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 1095); see id. (requiring that if a
person is convicted of, or awaiting trial for, a sex offense against a minor or has been convicted for an offense
specified in the California Penal Code §§ 243.4, 273a, 273d, or 368(a)-(b), or convicted of a felony or another
crime, except a minor traffic violation, then the person is to be discharged, removed from the family home, or
barred from entering the family home unless granted an exemption by the Department of Developmental
Services); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 4689.2(f), 4689.3,4689.4, 4689.5,4689.6 (enacted by Chapter 1095)
(setting forth the procedures and standards to determine whether an exemption is to be granted or an exception
made to the criminal record check requirement); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West Supp. 1994)
(defining sexual battery); id. § 273a (West Supp. 1994) (defining willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment
of a child); id. § 273d (West Supp. 1994) (defining corporal punishment or injury of a child); id. § 368(a)-(b)
(West 1988) (relating to infliction of physical pain or mental suffering on an elder or dependant adult).
13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4441 (West 1984).
14. 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 1252, sec. 549, at 4514 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4475).
15. CAL WELF & INST. CODE § 4475(a) (enacted by Chapter 1095); see id. (requiring that the eight
members of the advisory board be appointed by the Governor from a list of nominations submitted by the
boards of supervisors of counties within each developmental center's designated service area).
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for persons with developmental disabilities. 6 Prior law required the State Council
to meet at least nine times per year. 17 Chapter 1095 decreases the required
meetings to six times per year.'"
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Across the United States, there has been a movement towards providing a
community living option for the developmentally disabled. Some reports state
foster family care has been successful for children with developmental
disabilities. Chapter 1095 extends this successful program to apply to adults
through the creation of family homes and family home agencies.2'
Bonnie M. George
Health and Welfare; health care providers-refusal of resuscitative
measures
Health and Safety Code § 1569.74 (new); Probate Code § 4753
(new)
SB 1557 (Thompson); 1994 STAT. Ch. 966
Under existing law, an adult has a right to control the decision to have life-
sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn if he or she is suffering from a
terminal condition2 or permanent unconscious condition3 and may do so by
16. Id. §§ 4520,4540 (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 4520 (West Supp. 1994) (creating the State Council
on Developmental Disabilities); id. § 4540 (West Supp. 1994) (listing the powers and duties of the state
council).
17. 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 1244, sec. 4, at 4292 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4535).
18. CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 4535(a) (amended by Chapter 1095).
19. SENATE COMM=ITIEE ON HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvIcEs, CommirrEr ANALYSIS OF SB 1730. at 2
(Apr. 13, 1994). See generally Philip R. Ziring et al., Provision of Health Care for Persons With
Developmental Disabilities Living in the Community, 260 JAMA 1439, 1439 (1988) (providing national
statistics evidencing the deinstitutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities).
20. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvICEs, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1730, at 2
(Apr. 13, 1994); see id (reporting that the option of foster care for children with developmental disabilities has
proven to be a successful family oriented alternative to institutional or group home care).
21. Id.
I. See CALHEALTHm&SAFmTYCODE§ 7186(d) (West Supp. 1994) (defining life-sustaining treatment).
2. See id. § 71860) (WVest Supp. 1994) (defining terminal condition); see also Battling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1984) (stating that the right to have life-support
equipment disconnected is not limited to comatose, terminally ill patients).
3. See CAL HEALTH &SAFETYCODE § 7186(e) (West Supp. 1994) (defining permanent unconscious
condition); see also id. § 7185.5(a) (West Supp. 1994) (finding a fundamental right to control certain decisions
regarding health care).
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executing a declaration4 of instructions to be used in the event he or she is unable
to make such a decision.5 Such a declaration is without effect when made by a
patient in a skilled nursing facility6 or long term health care facility7 unless one
of the witnesses is designated as a patient advocate by the State Department of
Aging.'
Existing law also authorizes the appointment of an attorney in fact to make
health care decisions? in the event of incapacitationt° and provides conditional
immunity to a health care provider"t who acts in good faith reliance on a decision
made by an attorney in fact. 2 Existing law also provides conditional immunity
to a health care provider who gives effect to a declaration requesting a natural
death. 3 However, existing law does not authorize or approve mercy killing,
4. See it § 7186.5(a)() (West Supp. 1994) (providing the requirements of a declaration concerning
life-sustaining treatment). But see People v. Adams, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1438 n.1, 265 Cal. Rptr. 568, 572
n.I (1990) (commenting that a written directive is not the only method by which one may exercise the right
to determine one's own medical treatment).
5. CAL HEALTH & SAFrY CODE § 7185.5(d) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (recognizing the right of an
adult to make a written declaration that would provide instructions to a physician to allow the adult to die a
natural death without technologically prolonging a terminal condition or vegetative state); Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990) (deriving a constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse
unwanted medical treatment); see also Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 306-07, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 530, 533-34 (1988) (holding that the conservator of a patient in a persistent vegetative state can authorize
the removal of a feeding tube, but cannot force a physician to remove the tube against personal moral
objections if the patient can be transferred to another physician who will).
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining skilled nursing facility
as a place providing skilled nursing and supportive care for patients who require such care for an extended
period of time).
7. See id. § 1418(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining long term health care facility).
8. Id. § 7187 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (providing that the patient advocate may be designated by
the State Department of Aging).
9. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2430(b)-(c) (West 1993) (defining health care and health care decision).
10. See BLACK'S LAW D1CnONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990) (defining incapacitated person as one unable to
make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his or her person); see also CAL. CIrV. CODE § 2433
(West 1993) (stating that a person retains the right to make health care decisions so long as he or she can give
informed consent); id. § 2434 (West 1993) (specifying that the durable power of attorney does not give an
attorney in fact authority to make a health care decision if the principal can make an informed decision).
11. See CAL Civ. CODE § 2430(d) (West 1993) (defining health care provider as one authorized by law
to administer health care).
12. Id. § 2438 (West 1993).
13. CAL- HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190.5(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (providing that a
physician or other health care provider will not be held liable or disciplined for giving effect to a declaration
unless the health care provider knew the declaration had been revoked, did not meet reasonable medical
standards, or did not believe in good faith that his actions were lawful); see Baffling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 191-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222-23 (1984) (discussing physicians' refusal to remove the
respirator tube for moral reasons as well as for fear of potential civil and criminal liability, although Bartling
and his family released the hospital and physicians from any civil liability). No other hospital was willing to
undertake the care of Mr. Bartling. Id. at 195 n.7, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.7; see also Bartling v. Glendale
Adventist Med. Ctr., 184 Cal. App. 3d 961,968, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 362 (1986) (discussing other institutions'
refusals to take Battling because of both the medical costs they might incur as well as possible litigation
expense).
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except for the withholding or the withdrawal of health care to allow a natural
death.1
4
Under Chapter 966, the Legislature states that a competent adult has the right
to refuse resuscitation after cardiac or respiratory arrest whether the need arises
in a prehospital setting, a hospital, or other clinical setting. 5 Chapter 966
provides immunity for a health care provider 6 who honors a request to forego
resuscitation,' 7 provided the decision is made in good faith reliance on the request
and is consistent with the law." Under Chapter 966, licensed residential care
facilities for the elderly that employ licensed health care providers may establish
policies to honor requests to forego resuscitation. 9
14. CAL. Ctv. CODE § 2443 (West 1993); see Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017.
18, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,491 (1983) (holding that while a physician may have a duty to provide life-sustaining
mechanical care immediately after a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue treatment that has
proven ineffective; therefore, the defendant physicians were not guilty of murder). But see Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (1986) (Compton, J., concurring) (writing that
"[t]he right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so long as the rights of others are
not affected" and that it was inhumane for the medical profession not to assist a patient to an easy death but
force a patient to suffer the ordeal of starving herself to death to achieve her objective). See generally ]an
Gentles, Death and Dignity, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 8, 1993, at BI (discussing the popular movement supporting
legalized euthanasia and suggesting problems with the concept).
In 1992, the Dutch government, investigating the practice of euthanasia, found that Dutch
physicians kill more than 1000 patients a year without the patient's request, a quarter of whom were not
incapacitated. Id. The study also found that most Dutch physicians working in nursing homes withhold or
withdraw life-prolonging treatment without the patient's consent, and that 86% of the "do not resuscitate"
decisions made in hospitals were also made without the patient's consent. Id. These numbers refer mainly to
the elderly. Id. See generally Dutch Court Won't Punish Suicide Doctor, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 1994, at A10
(reporting on the Dutch Supreme Court's landmark decision not to punish a psychiatrist who helped a healthy,
50-year-old woman kill herself after she became depressed over her husband's desertion and the loss of her
two sons). A Dutch law that passed in 1993 regulates euthanasia and assisted suicide; the Dutch Supreme
Court's ruling would allow mercy killings for mental as well as physical pain. Id.
15. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 966, sec. 1, at 4757 (declaring the right of a competent adult to control
whether or not he or she will receive health care); see id. § 1 (a)-(d) (stating that the right to refuse is not
limited to cardiac or respiratory arrest emergencies and that it is in the interest of public health and welfare to
set up a procedure for honoring an individual's right to refuse heroic resuscitative measures); CAL. PROB, CODE
§ 4753 (f) (enacted by Chapter 966) (specifying that its provisions apply whether the individual is within or
outside of a health care facility).
16. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4753(g) (enacted by Chapter 966) (defining health care provider for the
purposes of this section to include emergency response employees and members of specially trained volunteer
organizations).
17. See id. § 4753(b)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 966) (defining a request to forego resuscitative measures
as a written document that must be signed by the individual or a surrogate health care decisionmaker and a
physician and surgeon, and requiring that the request include a "do not resuscitate" form, the content and form
of which is specified by the section). The request may also be evidenced by a medallion issued by the
Emergency Medical Services Authority. Id.
18. Id. § 4753(a) (enacted by Chapter 966); see id. (setting forth the requirement that the health care
provider's decision be made in a good faith belief that the decision is consistent with California Probate Code
§ 4753 and made with no knowledge that the individual who signed the request would have chosen differently
under the circumstances); id, § 4753(e) (enacted by Chapter 966) (stating that a request may be presumed valid
and unrevoked in the absence of any knowledge to the contrary).
19. CAL- HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1569.74(a) (enacted by Chapter 966); see id. § 1569.74(b)-(c)
(enacted by Chapter 966) (establishing the guidelines for such a policy, which include a prohibition against
facility staff from signing such a directive as a witness or as the surrogate decisionmaker, and providing that
only a licensed health care provider employed by the facility and on the premises at the time of the emergency
Pacific Law Journal!Vol. 26
Health and Welfare
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Advances in medicine and technology have drawn issues of death and dying
into sharp public controversy, presenting difficult legal issues concerning
patients' rights that legislators and courts have sought to resolve.o Most state
courts have found a right to refuse medical treatment based on the common-law
right to informed consent, a constitutional right to privacy, or state statutes.' In
the case of an incompetent, however, the state is entitled to guard against potential
abuses by surrogates and to require evidence of the incompetent's wishes
Chapter 966 was enacted to provide immunity to health care workers who honor"
may make the decision to honor a request to forego resuscitation).
20. See Joanna K. Weinberg, Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism, Community, and the Right to
Die: A Commentaryon the New Jersey Experience, 40 HAsnNGsLJ. 119, 134-40 (1988) (discussing the legal
system's response to issues of aging and loss of autonomy, and in particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court's
response, which attempted to reconcile the doctrines of best interests and self-determination). See generally
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012-13, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,487 (1983) (discussing the legal
dispute arising from the gap between statutory law and modem medicine); In re Guardianship of Browning,
568 So. 2d 4, 8 n.I (Fla. 1990) (reviewing a moot claim because the issue is of "great public importance and
likely to recur"); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Who Won't Pull the Plug? It's Not Modern Medicine, But the Families
That Won't Give Up, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1994, at C3 (claiming that contrary to popular public perceptions,
most physicians today are more willing to stop life-sustaining interventions, including tube feedings and
hydration, than are the patients or their family members).
21. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269-76 (1990) (reviewing the common
law right of self-determination and informed consent, the constitutional right of privacy as balanced against
State interests, as well as state statutory law, as the bases upon which courts have found a right to refuse
treatment); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 200, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 849 (1988) (finding
that California Probate Code § 2355 gives the conservator of an estate the power to withhold or withdraw
consent to medical treatment when that decision is made in good faith and based on medical advice), cert.
denied sub nom Drabick v. Drabick, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 17
(Fla. 1990) (concluding that both competent and incompetent persons have the right to determine their medical
treatment, and holding that a surrogate or proxy may exercise that right "for one who has become incompetent
and who, while competent, expressed his or her wishes orally or in writing"); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d
77, 80 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that a patient who wished to refuse a blood transfusion after a Caesarian delivery
had a common-law and a statutory right to decline the transfusions based on a finding that there were no
superior State interests to outweigh the patient's choice); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-
7194.5 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the provisions of The Natural Death Act); Carol M. Ostrom, When is
it Time to Die? Elderly Look Life and Death in the Eye, SEATnETha2s, June 16, 1993, at Al (mentioning new
guidelines being drafted in the Washington Legislature in accord with Washington's own Natural Death Act,
which would allow emergency-medical technicians to honor "do not resuscitate" bracelets issued to persons
judged to be terminally ill by a physician, while many wish to broaden the rules to include nonterminal
patients); Paula Voel, Your Decree on Dying a Living Will and Health Care Proxy Make a Patient's Final
Wishes on Treatment Perfectly Clear, BUFFALO NEws, May 25, 1994, at 11 (discussing health care proxies and
mentioning a Health Care Surrogate Bill pending in committee in the New York Legislature which would allow
a health care facility to choose an agent if an individual had not done so).
22. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-82 (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require a state to
accept the judgment of close family members where there is no evidence of the patient's wishes); Grace Plaza
v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that if a nursing home has no clear evidence of the
patient's wishes, it may refuse to honor a surrogate's request to forego a patient's treatment); see also
Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 217-18, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 (1988) (finding that where
a patient did not employ the statutory mechanisms provided, a conservator was not precluded from making the
decision to forego medical treatment for the conservatee, and may do so without prior judicial approval after
considering the conservatee's best interests and previously expressed wishes, as well as the physician's advice),
cert. denied sub nom Drabick v. Drabick, 488 U.S. 958 (1988).
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"do not resuscitate" requests, whether within or outside a health care facility, and
establishes formal guidelines for the legal form which they are to assume?3
Molly K. Mosley
Health and Welfare; health care services-licensure of outpatient surgical
settings
Business and Professions Code §§ 2215, 2216, 2217 (new); Health and
Safety Code §§ 1248, 1248.1, 1248.15, 1248.2, 1248.25, 1248.3,
1248.35, 1248.4, 1248.5, 1248.55, 1248.6, 1248.65, 1248.7, 1248.75,
1248.8, 1248.85 (new).
AB 595 (Speier); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1276
Existing law mandates that the State Department of Health Services' license
and regulate certain health facilities.2 Chapter 1276 prohibits physicians and
surgeons from performing procedures, on or after July 1, 1996, in surgical
outpatient settings 3 which use specified anesthesia4 unless the setting is exempted
by law.5
23. SENATEFLOORCOOMMrEECoMMrEEANALYSiSOPSB 1557, at 2 (Apr. 7, 1994): see CAt. PROD.
CODE § 4753(b)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 966) (defining the form of requests to forego resuscitative measures);
see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1569.74(b)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 966) (establishing the policy
guidelines regarding "do not resuscitate" requests for licensed residential care facilities for the elderly).
1. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 100 (West.1990) (creating the State Department of Health
Services within the Health and Welfare Agency).
2. Id. § 1250.1 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (naming general acute care hospitals, nursing facilities,
intermediate care facilities, acute psychiatric, chemical dependency, congregate living health facilities, pediatric
day health and respite care facilities, and correctional treatment centers as entities subject to regulation by the
Department of Health Services).
3. See id. § 1248(c) (enacted by Chapter 1276) (defining outpatient setting as any facility, clinic,
unlicensed clinic, center, office, or other setting not part of a general acute care facility and where specified
anesthesia is used); ido § 1250(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining general acute care hospital as a facility that has
a responsible governing body and organized medical staff that provides 24-hour inpatient care); see also infra
note 4 (discussing the specified anesthesia).
4. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2216 (enacted by Chapter 1276) (excluding settings which
administer local anesthesia, peripheral nerve blocks anti-anxiety, and pain-relieving medications which, when
administered within the community standard of practice do not have the probability of placing the patient at
risk for the loss of life-preserving protective reflexes); see also DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, OF cE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-07-91-10470, SURGERY IN OUTPATIENT SETINoS: A FOUR
STATE STUDY, at 1 (1991) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL STUDY] (categorizing a procedure as a "risk-associated procedure" by the effects of anesthesia which
"compromise a patient's protective reflexes").
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2216 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. (forbidding all physicians and
surgeons from performing surgery in an outpatient setting using specified levels of anesthesia unless the setting
is specified in California Health and Safety Code § 1248.1); see also infra note 6 (listing the specified settings
of California Health and Safety Code § 1248.1).
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Chapter 1276 prohibits any entity from operating an outpatient facility unless
it is one enumerated as certified or accredited under federal or state law.6 Chapter
1276 sets forth minimum standards outpatient settings must meet to be accredited,
and procedures for accreditation as well as denial of accreditation.7 Chapter 1276
also authorizes action to be taken upon discovery of a facility not in compliance.8
Chapter 1276 authorizes the Division of Licensing of the Medical Board of
California to approve accreditation agenciesgthat meet certain standards!" Chapter
1276 further provides for regular evaluation of approved accreditation agencies
and a process for the termination of the approval of an agency." Chapter 1276
6. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1248.1 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. (prohibiting any
association, corporation, firm, partnership, or person from operating an outpatient setting in California unless
it is a(n): (1) Medicare certified outpatient surgical center, (2) clinic operated under a federally recognized
Indian Tribe or organization; (3) clinic run by the United States; (4) licensed primary care or surgical clinic;
(5) general acute care hospital; (6) outpatient setting in compliance with the law used by dentists, physicians,
or surgeons; (7) accredited outpatient setting; or (8) mobile van facility used in close connection with certain
of the above settings).
7. Id. §§ 1248.15, 1248.2, 1248.25 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. § 1248.15 (enacted by Chapter
1276) (requiring the Division of Licensing of the Medical Board of California to adopt standards for
accreditation and to ensure that the certification program includes standards for the following aspects: (1)
Allied health staff to be licensed or certified as required by law; (2) appropriate personnel, medication and
equipment on site to handle medical emergencies; (3) a system for transferring patients to an acute care hospital
in the event of a medical emergency; and (4) systems for maintenance of clinical records, patient monitoring
and quality improvement); id § 1248.2 (enacted by Chapter 1276) (allowing outpatient settings to apply to an
accreditation agency for a certificate of accreditation that will be issued solely upon compliance with the
specified standards and requiring a list of accredited settings will be maintained and made available to the
public); id. § 1248.25 (enacted by Chapter 1276) (requiring accreditation agencies to deny accreditation if the
outpatient setting does not meet the approved standards).
8. Id. § 1248.35(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. § 1248.35(b)(1)-(3) (authorizing the
Division of Medical Quality or an accreditation agency to enter and inspect any accredited setting and, if it is
determined the facility is not in compliance with the standards of the accreditation agency, to do any of the
following: Issue a reprimand; place the outpatient setting on probation; and, upon proper notice, suspend or
revoke the facility's accreditation).
9. See id. § 1248(d) (enacted by Chapter 1276) (defining accreditation agency as a public or private
organization that is approved to issue certificates of accreditation to outpatient settings).
10. Id. § 1248.4 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. § 1248.4(c)(l)-(10) (enacted by Chapter 1276)
(listing the criteria the accreditation agency must meet to be approved). The agency must: (1) Include the
Division of Licensing standards as well as patient care and safety standards within its accreditation program;
(2) submit its accreditation standards at least every three years to the Division of Licensing; (3)maintain
internal quality management programs; (4) have a review and revision process for accreditation standards;
(5) have qualified accreditation review teams; (6) have standards for accreditation developed with input from
the medical community and outpatient surgery industry; (7) screen and credential its reviewers; and (8) not
have an ownership interest in the delivery of health care services to patients. Id.
11. Id. §§ 1248.5, 1248.55 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. § 1248.5 (enacted by Chapter 1276)
(providing that the division may evaluate approved accreditation agencies at least every three years, or in
response to complaints against the agency or against one of the outpatient settings that agency accredits); see
also id. § 1248.55(b) (enacted by Chapter 1276) (requiring that, before terminating approval of the agency, the
agency be notified of the deficiencies and be given time to supply information demonstrating compliance with
Chapter 1276); id. § 1248.55(c)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 1276) (providing that if approval of the
accreditation agency is terminated, then the outpatient settings which it accredited must be notified and be
given 12 months to seek accreditation from an approved agency, unless the division has information that the
operation of the outpatient setting poses an imminent risk of harm to the health of an individual; in that
instance, the division must order the facility to cease operations).
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also creates a fund for depositing accreditation fees which are used for
implementing and administering these provisions. 2
Chapter 1276 provides that a willful 3 and knowing violation of its provisions
by physicians and surgeons constitutes unprofessional conduct. 4 Chapter 1276
further authorizes the Division of Medical Quality or the local District Attorney
to bring an action to enjoin a violation or threatened violation of its provisions. 15
In addition, willful violation of any provision of Chapter 1276 is a misdemeanor,
carrying a maximum fine of $1,000 per day of violation. 6
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1276 was enacted to ensure that health care services are safely and
effectively performed in outpatient surgical settings.' 7 Concern regarding these
services comes as a result of the shift in surgeries, traditionally done on a
inpatient basis, to outpatient settings.' As a result of this shift, there has been
concern at both the state and the national level that the growth in outpatient
surgeries has outpaced the government's ability to ensure the quality and safety
12. Id. § 1248.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 1276).
13. See id. § 1248.8(c) (enacted by Chapter 1276) (defining willfully or willful for purposes of Chapter
1276 to mean that the person doing an act or omitting to do an act intends the act or omission and knows the
relevant circumstances connected with the act or omission).
14. Id. § 1248.65 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2221 (West Supp. 1994)
(allowing the Division of Licensing to deny a physician and surgeon's certificate or issue a probationary
certificate if the physician is guilty of unprofessional conduct); id. § 2234 (West 1990) (providing that the
Division of Medical Quality must take action against a licensed physician or surgeon charged with
unprofessional conduct); see also Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 73 n.6, 435 P.2d 553,
558 n.6, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790 n.6 (1968) (noting that the purpose of the revocation of a doctor's certificate
is not to punish the doctor but rather to protect the public); Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, 81 Cal. App.
3d 564, 574-75, 146 Cal. Rptr. 653, 659-60 (1978) (holding that the term unprofessional conduct is not overly
broad and that it must relate to conduct that indicates an unfitness to practice medicine).
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1248.7 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. § 1248.75(a) (enacted
by Chapter 1276) (requiring that, before the Division of Medical Quality seeks an injunction, the outpatient
setting be notified of its violations of Chapter 1.3 (commencing with § 1248) of the California Health and
Safety Code and be given a reasonable time to correct the deficiencies); see also id. § 1248.75(c) (enacted by
Chapter 1276) (allowing the Division of Medical Quality to institute immediate injunction proceedings if it
determines that an outpatient setting poses an immediate and substantial hazard to the health and safety of the
patient if the hazard may not reasonably be corrected through a plan of correction).
16. Id. § 1248.8(a) (enacted by Chapter 1276); see id. § 1248.8(b)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 1276)
(providing that, in determining the punishment to be imposed, all relevant facts be considered, including, but
not limited to, the following: (1) Whether the violation exposed an individual to the risk of death or serious
harm; (2) whether the violation had a direct or immediate relationship to the health, safety, or security of an
individual; (3) evidence of willfulness in the violation; and (4) good faith efforts by the outpatient setting to
prevent the violation).
17. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2215 (enacted by Chapter 1276).
18. OFmCnE OFINsPEc- R GENERAL TruDysupra note 4, at 1; see id. (quoting a Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations estimate that by 1995, 65% of all surgical procedures will be
performed outside the hospital); see also Mark A. warner, MD et. al., Major Morbidity and Mortality Within
1 Month of Ambulatory Surgery and Anesthesia, 270 JAMA 1437, 1437 (1993) (stating that ambulatory
surgical procedures have proliferated in recent years); Projected Growth in Top Outpatient Procedures,
HOSPITALS, Nov. 20, 1992, at 14 (predicting a growth rate of greater than sixty percent in the outpatient
surgical procedures reviewed between 1992 and 2002).
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of these procedures. 9 Chapter 1276 responds to the above concerns, and provides
that California's outpatient surgical settings, as defined, will be regulated by the
Medical Board of California. 0
Bonnie M. George
Health and Welfare; health service plans-medical disclosure and injection
cards
Business and Professions Code §§ 803.3, 4227.4 (new); Health and
Safety Code §§ 1363.1, 1373.19 (new); Insurance Code §§ 10123.19,
11512.33 (new).
AB 3260 (Bornstein); 1994 STAT. Ch. 653
Existing law defines health service plan, disability insurance policy, and
nonprofit hospital service plan.' Chapter 653 requires that any health service plan,
19. See Kathleen Z. McKenna, Assembly Bill Would Tighten Standards for Surgery at Clinics,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 1993, at A3 (quoting the author of Chapter 1276 as saying that outpatient clinics
operate virtually unregulated as long as a licensed physician is in charge); see also OFicE OF INSPECTOR
GEtERAL STuDY, supra note 4, at 7 (reporting that one third of the surgical outpatient settings in the four-state
study, which included California, performing high risk procedures, which were defined by the levels of
anesthesia used similar to Chapter 1276, are neither licensed or accredited); id. at 10 (recommending that states
examine their licensure rules to ensure the quality of surgery performed in outpatient settings). But see Warner,
et al., supra note 18, at 1441 (concluding that overall risk of major injury and death from outpatient surgical
procedures with concurrent anesthetic care is very low); A Medical Dilemma, COURIER J., Feb. 28, 1993, at
D2 (reporting that there is almost no documented evidence that physicians have abused the latitude that they
have to perform surgery in an outpatient setting). See generally House Small Business Regulation, Business
Opportunities, and Energy Subcommittee Regarding Consumer Protection in the Health Care Field, Fed. News
Serv., 2359 (June 28, 1993) (quoting Representative Ron Wyden (D-OR) as statifig that his subcommittee has
been concerned about the lack of oversight of outpatient surgeries and that he hopes to get some oversight for
that fast growing area of health care as part of health reform); Warren E. Leary, Outpatient Surgery on the Rise;
Regulation Doesn't Keep Pace, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at C12 (quoting Representative Ron Wyden as
saying that he will soon introduce legislation which requires more regulation of outpatient surgeries and that
the growth of outpatient surgeries has already outpaced federal and state governments' ability to hssure health
care quality and safety).
20. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2215 (enacted by Chapter 1276); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERvICEs, CoMMrITEE ANALYSIS oFAB 595, at 2-3 (Apr. 6, 1994) (referring to studies showing
the trend towards outpatient surgery and quoting the author of Chapter 1276 as saying outpatient surgical
facilities now operate virtually without regulation as long as a licensed physician is in charge).
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345(f) (West Supp. 1994); CAL. INS. CODE § 106 (West 1993);
id. §§ 11491-11517 (vest 1993 & Supp. 1994); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345(0 (West Supp.
1994) (defining health care service plan as any person who undertakes to arrange for the provision of health
care services to subscribers or enrollees, or to pay for or reimburse any part of the cost for such services, in
return for a prepaid or periodic charge paid by or on behalf of such subscribers or enrollees); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 106 (Vest 1993) (defining disability insurance as including insurance appertaining to injury, disablement,
or death resulting to the insured from accidents, and appertaining to disablements resulting to the insured from
sickness); id. §§ 11491-11517 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (providing statutory provisions for the operation of
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disability insurance policy, or nonprofit hospital service plan that includes terms
that require binding arbitration to settle disputes and that restrict or provide for
a waiver of, the right to a jury trial must include a specific disclosure. Chapter
653 also requires that policies or plans which provide for the selection of a single
neutral arbitrator by the parties in disputes involving $50,000 or less, or, if the
parties are unableto agree on the selection of an arbitrator, the method provided
in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6 to select an arbitrator will
be used.3 These requirements may not be waived. 4
Existing law requires that malpractice judgments in excess of $30,000 against
specified licensed health care professionals be reported by the clerk of the court
to the licensing agency.5 As of July 1, 1995, this information may be released to
nonprofit hospital service plans).
2. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (enacted by Chapter 653); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.19
(enacted by Chapter 653); id. § 11512.33 (enacted by Chapter 653); see CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §
1363.1(a)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 653) (requiring health service plans to include a disclosure that meets the
following conditions: (1) Disclose whether the plan uses binding arbitration to settle disputes, specifically
including medical malpractice claims; (2) cause the disclosure to appear as a separate article in the agreement
and to be prominently displayed on the enrollment form signed by each subscriber or enrollee; (3) be
substantially expressed in the wording provided in California Code of Civil Procedure § 1295(a); and (4) be
displayed immediately before the signature line); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.19(a)(l)-(3) (enacted by Chapter
653) (listing the same conditions for disability insurance policies as listed above for health care service plans
with the exception of the requirement that the language from the California Code of Civil Procedure be used);
id. § 11512.33(a)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 653) (listing the same conditions for non-profit hospital plans as
listed for disability insurance policies); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1982) (requiring that
any contract for medical services containing a provision for arbitration of any dispute as to the professional
negligence of a health care provider be disclosed). The disclosure must read as follows:
It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any
medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were
improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission
to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court
process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings.
Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right
to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are
accepting the use of arbitration.
Id.
3. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1373.19 (enacted by Chapter 653); CAL INS. CODE § 10123.19(b)
(enacted by Chapter 653); id. § 11512.33(b) (enacted by Chapter 653); see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1281.6
(West 1982) (providing that when an agreed method of appointing an arbitrator fails, the court, on petition of
a party, will appoint the arbitrator).
4. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1373.19 (enacted by Chapter 653); CAL INS. CODE § 10123.19(b)
(enacted by Chapter 653); id. § 11512.33(b) (enacted by Chapter 653).
5. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 803 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (requiring that the following actions
taken by or against a person who holds a license or certificate from the Board of Behavioral Science
Examiners, or from an agency listed in California Business and Professions Code § 800(a), be reported to the
licensing agency: (1) Conviction of a crime; (2) ajudgment of $30,000 caused by the professional's negligence,
error or omission; or (3) the rendering of unauthorized professional services); see also id. § 800(a) (West Supp.
1994) (listing the licensing agencies to be the Board of Dental Examiners; Osteopathic Medical Board of
California; Board of Chiropractic Examiners; California Board of Registered Nursing; Board of Vocational
Nurse and Psychiatric Technician Examiners; State Board of Optometry; Board of Examiners in Veterinary
Medicine; and State Board of Pharmacy).
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members of the public who ask for it.6 Chapter 653 provides that any arbitration
award under a health care service plan contract for death or personal injury that
is over $30,000, will be considered a judgment under these provisions, and thus
will be reported to the appropriate licensing agency and be available to the
public.7
Existing law imposes requirements regarding the content and administration
of prescription drugs.' Chapter 653 authorizes licensed health care facilities9 to
administer controlled substances"° through the use of an injection card system."'
Chapter 653 further mandates minimum requirements that must be followed when
such a system is put into place.' 2 Chapter 653 specifically does not impose new
requirements on the use of injection card systems for noncontrolled substances.13
6. Id. § 803(b) (West Supp. 1994) (operative July 1, 1995); see id (providing that the information the
court provides to the licensing agency regarding felony convictions and judgments in excess of $30,000 against
a physician, surgeon or doctor of podiatric medicine will be released to an inquiring member of the public).
7. Id. § 803.3 (enacted by Chapter 653); see id. (stating that such arbitration awards will be deemed
a judgment for purposes of California Business and Professions Code § 803(b)).
8. Id. §§ 4030-4049.6 (West 1990); see id. (designating these sections as part of the Pharmacy Law);
id. § 4031(1)-(4) (West 1990) (defining drugs as: (1) Articles recognized in official pharmacopoeias or
formulary; (2) articles intended for use in diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man
or animal; (3) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or function of man or animal; or (4)
articles intended to be used as a component in one of the articles listed above); id. § 4036 (vest Supp. 1994)
(defining prescription as an oral or written order given by a physician, dentist, podiatrist or veterinarian for a
drug or device for specified individuals or an individual).
9. See id. § 4227.4(a) (enacted by Chapter 653) (defining licensed health care facility as a health
facility defined in California Health and Safety Code § 1250 or operated by a health care service plan); see also
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250 (West Supp. 1994) (defining health facility to include general acute care
hospitals, acute psychiatric hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, and congregate
living health facilities).
10. See CAL HEALTH&SAFETYCODE § 11007 (West 1991) (defining controlled substances as a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor which is listed in §§ 11054-11058); 1d. § 11054 (West 1991) (listing
Schedule I controlled substances); id. § 11055 (West 1991) (listing Schedule II controlled substances); id §
11056 (West Supp. 1994) (listing Schedule III controlled substances); id. § 11057 (West Supp. 1994) (listing
Schedule IV controlled substances); id. § 11058 (West 1991) (listing Schedule V controlled substances).
11. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4227.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 653); see id. § 4227.4(b) (enacted by
Chapter 653) (defining injection card system as a system which enables a facility to authorize an outpatient to
receive injections at the facility, pursuant to a doctor's order, through the use of a card which is maintained at
the facility where the injections are administered).
12. Id. § 4227A(b), (d) (enacted by Chapter 653); see id. § 4227.4(b) (enacted by Chapter 653)
(requiring that the injection card contain at least the date of authorization; number and frequency of injections
authorized; name, strength and amount of drug authorized; names of prescribing doctor and the patient; date
and time of each injection; and the signature of the person giving the injection); id. § 4227.4(d)(1)-(9) (enacted
by Chapter 653) (requiring that a facility utilizing injection cards have written protocols for its use which have
been developed by at least a doctor, registered nurse, and pharmacist; and that the protocol provides at least
for: (I) Identification of drugs to be included in the injection card system; (2) distinction among classes of
drugs; (3) periodic review of the efficacy of the injection card system; (4) determination of the availability of
a doctor needed for each drug included in the system; (5) a recordkeeping system which allows for the
identification of patient abuse of the drug or adverse drug reactions and provides a system for discontinuing
the physician's order, (6) retention of the injection card by the facility when a controlled substance is being
administered; (7) adequate initial evaluation of patients; (8) ongoing medical evaluation of the patient's
response to the injection card system; and (9) injection cards that will become a permanent part of the patient's
medical record within 15 days from the administration of the last authorized dose).
13. Id. § 4227A(e) (enacted by Chapter 653).
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INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 653, there was concern that plans and
policies did not adequately advise consumers that the terms of a health plan
restricted or waived the consumer's right to a jury trial in medical malpractice
cases. 4 Chapter 653 remedies this concern by requiring prominent notice of
binding arbitration requirements in health service plans and disability insurance
policies.'
5
Chapter 653 provides for the use of a single neutral arbitrator in cases pleaded
at $50,000 or less. 6 The purpose of this provision is to lower the cost and
increase the efficiency of resolving disputes in the health care industry."
Chapter 653 treats medical malpractice arbitration awards as judgments, thus
requiring arbitration awards over $30,000 to be disclosed to the public."8 This
requirement is an attempt to close a loophole which allowed a health care
professional, who works only under contracts requiring binding arbitration, to
avoid any public disclosure of malpractice awards against him or her.'
Chapter 653 establishes requirements for the use of injection card systems by
health care facilities.20 This provision was enacted in response to a medical
14. ASSEMBLYCOMMrTEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 3260, at 4 (Apr. 19, 1994); see
Summary of AB 3260-Medical Disclosure and Shotcards, at 1, provided by the author's (Bornstein) office
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Memorandum] (stating that the goal of the arbitration
disclosure section of AB 3260 is consumer protection and awareness).
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (enacted by Chapter 653); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.19
(enacted by Chapter 653); id. § 11512.33 (enacted by Chapter 653); see supra note 3 and accompanying text
(describing specific requirements for the disclosure of terms of the plan that restrict or waive the right to a jury
trial in medical malpractice cases); see also ASSEMBLY COMMrTfEE ON HEALTH, COMM'rrEE ANALYSIS OF AB
3260, at 4 (Apr. 19, 1994) (explaining the prominent notices of binding arbitration required on the contract
forms).
16. CAL HEALTH & SAFE Y CODE § 1373.19 (enacted by Chapter 653); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.19(b)
(enacted by Chapter 653); id. § 11512.33(b) (enacted by Chapter 653); see supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing the selection method for an arbitrator).
17. See AsSEIBLY COMMITIEE ON HEALTH, COMMIEE ANALYSIS OFAB 3260, at 5 (Apr. 19,1994)
(stating that three-member arbitration panels are often used in the health care industry and that three-member
panels may favor the plan rather than the consumer); see also Memorandum, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that
the use of one arbitrator will ease the cost and increase the efficiency of disputes arising in the health care
industry).
18. CAL- Bus. & PROF. CODE § 803 (West Supp. 1994); id. § 803(b) (West Supp. 1994); id. § 803.3
(enacted by Chapter 653); see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (specifying the judgments and awards
available to the inquiring public).
19. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at I (explaining that for doctors who work solely under contracts
that require arbitration to settle malpractice disputes, there is no chance of litigation and only arbitration awards
may be imposed against them for malpractice and stating that if information relating to those awards are not
available to the public, as they would be for a private physician who had litigated a malpractice claim, the
physician is protected from disclosure and the public is left in the dark).
20. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4227.4(c)-(e) (enacted by Chapter 653); see supra notes 10-13 and
accompanying text (explaining the requirements of an injection card system).
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malpractice action by a patient who complained that she had become addicted to
a painkiller through the use of an injection card.2'
Bonnie M. George
Health and Welfare; nonconsensual HIV testing of patients
Health and Safety Code §§ 199.65, 199.66, 199.67, 199.68 (new).
SB 1239 (Russell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 708
Under existing law, it is unlawful to force a person to disclose the identity or
personal characteristics of any person who has been tested for the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).' Existing law also prohibits the nonconsensual
disclosure of HIV test results in most instances, and imposes civil and criminal
penalties for unauthorized disclosure.2 Furthermore, existing law imposes a
written consent requirement in order to test a person's blood for HIV or acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) antibodies.3 Chapter 708 adds to existing
21. ASSEiBLY COMMITrEE ON HEALTH, COMMrTFEEANALYSIS oFAB 3260, at 6 (Apr. 19, 1994); see
Diana Sugg, State Panel Faults Kaiser in Drug Addiction Case, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 3, 1994, at A13
(reporting that the Medical Board was planning legislation to address the issues raised by a woman who
complained of addiction to a painkiller after taking part in a program utilizing "shot cards").
I. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1990); see id § 199.20 (prohibiting, with exceptions,
the compulsion of a person to disclose in any state, county, city, or other local civil, criminal, administrative,
legislative, or other proceeding, the identity of any individual tested for AIDS causing antibodies); see also id.
§ 26(b) (Vest Supp. 1994) (defining HIV as the etiologic virus of AIDS); id. §§ 199.45-A6 (West 1990)
(setting forth the findings of the Legislature regarding HIV and AIDS). See generally Projections of the
Number of Persons Diagnosed With AIDS and the Number of hnmunosuppressed HIV-Infected
Persons-United States, 1992-1994, 269 JAMA 733, 733 (1993) (discussing the projections by the Centers
for Disease Control of the number of persons infected with HIV); Richard M. Selik et al., HIV Infection as
Leading Cause of Death Among Young Adults in U.S. Cities and States, 269 JAMA 2991,2991 (1993) (stating
that HIV infection is the leading cause of death among young adults aged 25 to 44).
2. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (prohibiting the negligent or
willful disclosure of the results of an HIV test, except as otherwise provided by law, and setting forth penalties
for such disclosure); see also id § 199.25(a)-(b) (West 1990) (permitting health care providers to disclose the
results of an HIV test to the patient's sexual partners, persons believed to share hypodermic needles with the
patient, and the county health officer, but only after counseling the infected patient); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-
46(a) (Vest 1991) (stating that for purposes of federal grants, state law must ensure that any entity that
conducts HIV testing report the findings of such testing to the state public health officer confidentially for
statistical purposes); id. § 300ff-46(b) (West 1991) (providing for the development of a partner notification
program for those infected with HIV); id § 300ff-62 (West 1991) (mandating that persons to be tested for HIV
receive pretest counseling).
3. Id. § 199.22(a) (,Vest 1990); see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,244-45,502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 515 (1972) (establishing the rule in California requiring informed consent for medical treatment);
see also ASSEMBLY COMMITIE ON HEALTH, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1239, at 1 (July 13, 1993) (stating
that failure to obtain consent for medical treatment could result in an action for battery, negligence, or
unprofessional conduct).
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law by establishing a procedure for the testing of a patient's blood or other
material, in the case of exposure to a health care provider.4
Under Chapter 708, available blood or other samples of a source patient6
may be tested for HIV or AIDS antibodies if an exposed individual has
experienced a significant exposure to the blood or other potentially infectious
material9 of a source patient, provided that a specified procedure is followed l"
Included in the procedure for testing are a certification by another physician of
significant exposure, and counseling of the exposed individual." Health care
providers who do not adhere to the procedure set forth by Chapter 708 may be
guilty of a misdemeanor.' 2
Chapter 708 further provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law
and except as otherwise provided, if the HIV status of the source patient is
already known to be positive, the exposed individual may be informed of the
source patient's HIV status by the source patient's attending physician, but only
after the physician makes an attempt to obtain consent of such disclosure from the
source patient.'3 However, if the HIV status of the source patient is not known,
and if the exposed individual has tested negative on a baseline HIV test, Chapter
708 allows for the testing of available blood or material without the consent of the
4. CAL. HEALTH& SAFEY CODE §§ 199.65-.68 (enacted by Chapter 708); seeid. § 199.65(b) (enacted
by Chapter 708) (stating that the intent of the Legislature is to allow an exposed health care provider or
emergency first responder to learn the HIV status of the patient); see also id. § 199.65(a) (enacted by Chapter
708) (setting forth the concerns of the Legislature regarding HIV infection and the health care profession).
5. See id. § 199.66(b) (enacted by Chapter 708) (defining available blood or patient sample as blood
or material legally obtained before the exposure).
6. See id. § 199.660) (enacted by Chapter 708) (defining source patient as any person whose blood
or material has been the source of a significant exposure to a health care provider or first responder).
7. See id. § 199.66(d) (enacted by Chapter 708) (defining an exposed individual as any person who
is a health provider, first responder or employee, or volunteer or agent of a health care provider); see also id.
§ 199.66(e) (enacted by Chapter 708) (defining health care provider); id. § 199.66(0 (enacted by Chapter 708)
(defining first responder to include such persons as police, firefighters, rescue personnel or others who provide
similar emergency assistance).
8. See id. § 199.66(h) (enacted by Chapter 708) (defining significant exposure as direct contact that
meets the applicable guidelines established by the Division of Occupational Safety and Health).
9. See id. § 199.66(g) (enacted by Chapter 708) (defining other potentially infectious materials as any
bodily fluids that the Division of Occupational Health has determined are capable of transmitting HIV),
10. Id. § 199.67 (enacted by Chapter 708). For examples of several other states' provisions providing
for nonconsensual HIV testing of a patient's blood in the case of a significant exposure to a health care
provider, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(5) (Vest Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 381.004(i)(10), (11)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-22-9.2(g) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-16(b)(6) (Supp.
1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A(4) (West 1989); OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(E)(6)
(Baldwin 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-14(d), (e) (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.15(2)-(5) (Vest Supp.
1994).
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 199.67(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 708).
12. Id. § 199.68(b) (enacted by Chapter 708); see id. (providing that the maximum penalty for failure
to adhere to the specified procedure is imprisonment for one year and/or a $10,000 fine).
13. Id. § 199.67(c) (enacted by Chapter 708); see id. (stating that such a disclosure may be made
pursuant to California Heath and Safety Code § 199.24(b),(c) which permits, without written authorization,
the disclosure of the results of a blood test administered to detect antibodies that are the probable cause of
AIDS to a test subject's health care provider or agent or employee of the health care provider who provides
direct care or treatment to the patient).
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source patient, but only after making an effort to obtain the patient's informed
consent. 4 Chapter 708 also requires the physician seeking consent to make an
effort to provide the source patient with medical counseling, regardless of
whether the patient consents to testing.1
5
If the blood or other sample is tested, Chapter 708 provides that the source
patient must be informed of the results of the HIV test, unless he or she wishes
not to be informed. 16 If the source patient refuses to be informed, then the HIV
test results will only be provided to the exposed individual. 7 Also, Chapter 708
provides that if an exposed individual is informed of a patient's HIV status, the
exposed individual must be informed of confidentiality protections already
established by law.'"
Additionally, Chapter 708 provides for an exemption from civil and criminal
liability as well as professional disciplinary action for health care providers acting
consistent with the provisions of Chapter 708.29
COMMENT
The intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 708 is to provide a limited
window in which a patient's blood may be tested without the patient's consent,
in order to protect the interests of health care providers.2 In the event that a
patient's test is negative, the exposed individual will be less troubled about the
risk of being infected, and if the patient's test is positive, the exposed individual
can take precautionary measures not to infect others and to seek necessary
prophylactic treatment of the disease.2 '
However, those opposed to Chapter 708 assert that mandatory testing may
cause individuals to avoid needed medical care for fear that their HIV status will
be disclosed without their consent, and that such nonconsensual testing violates
patient autonomy.' It is also contended that testing gives a health care provider
14. Id. § 199.67(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 708); see id. (stating that the source patient or legal
representative of the source patient must be informed of the testing of available blood samples and that the
exposed individual must be informed of the results of the test); id. § 199.67(d)(1)(A)-(B) (enacted by Chapter
708) (setting forth the necessary procedure for attempting to obtain consent from the source patient).
15. Id. § 199.67(d)(1)(C) (enacted by Chapter 708).
16. Id. §199.67(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 708); see id. (providing that if the patient refuses to be
informed of the HIV test results, then he or she must sign a form documenting such refusal, and that the
patient's refusal to sign the form will constitute refusal to be informed).
17. Id. § 199.67(d)(4) (enacted by Chapter 708); see id. § 199.67(d)(3) (mandating that the HIV test
results be placed in the patient's medical record only when the patient has agreed to be informed of the results).
18. Id. § 199.67(e) (enacted by Chapter 708); see id. §§ 199.20, 199.21 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)
(providing that it is unlawful to disclose the identity of a person who has been tested for HIV). There are
several other states with confidentiality provisions. See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-583(a)(7) (West
Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §325-16(c) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 141.22A(2), (9) (West Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting the disclosure of an HIV test patient's identity).
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.68 (enacted by Chapter 708).
20. ASSEIBLY COMirrrEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1239, at 4 (June 28, 1994).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 45.
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a false sense of security of not being infected because there is a window period
between exposure to the HIV virus and its detectability,23 and that there is some
doubt as to the effectiveness of prophylactic treatment of AIDS.24 Finally,
opponents of Chapter 708 claim that mandatory testing is unnecessary because
if a patient does not voluntarily consent to testing, the health care provider should
assume that the patient is infected and take the necessary precautionary
measures.
25
Notwithstanding the aforementioned support and opposition, Chapter 708
raises significant constitutional issues.' The Fourth Amendment guarantees that
people shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures?' Accordingly,
in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,23 the United
States Supreme Court set forth the widely followed two-prong test for
determining if a search is granted Fourth Amendment protections: first, whether
the person has a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, whether society
recognizes that expectation as reasonable. 29 The Supreme Court decided the issue
of a nonconsensual blood test in Schmerber v. Californid by holding that a
blood test without a person's consent unequivocally qualifies as a search for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 3'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has distinguished between searches pursuant
to a criminal investigation and administrative searches.32 Administrative searches
23. See id. at 5; see also Elaine M. Sloand, M.D. et al., HIVTesting State ofthe Art, 266JAMA 2861,
2862-63 (1991) (stating that the window period between infection and detectability is usually about six to eight
weeks).
24. ASSEMBLYCOMMrI'i ON HEALTH, COMMITTEEANALYSIS OFSB 1239, at5 (June 28, 1994); see
also R. Gordon Douglas, Jr., M.D., Infectious Diseases, 263 JAMA 2648,2648 (1990) (stating that Zidovudine
(formerly AZT) is the only available treatment for AIDS and discussing its effectiveness).
25. ASSEiBLY COMMtmEE ON HEALTH, COMMiTTEr ANALYSIS ON SB 1239, at 5 (July 13, 1993). But
see id. (stating that lack of consent is rare).
26. Candace Crandall, Will AIDS Guidelines Work?, WASH. TmmEs, July 31, 1991, at 03; see id.
(discussing the issues involved with HIV testing of patients as well as health care providers); Larry 0. Gostin,
Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 JAMA 1621, 1625 (1989) (discussing the provisions in
some states for requiring nonconsensual HIV testing in the case of a significant exposure, and the possibility
of an invasion of privacy). See generally Kelly A. Bennett, Legislative Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The
Slow Death of Fourth Amendment Protection?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1413, 1422-35 (1989) (discussing the impact of
constitutional standards on mandatory AIDS testing legislation); Mary Edmondson, Comment, Public Health:
Private Rights and Public Health: Oklahoma AIDS Legislation and Guidelines for Policy, 45 OKLA. L. REV.
549, 549-65 (1992) (addressing the issue of nonconsensual testing based on statutory law in Oklahoma and
other states); Robert C. Waters, Florida's Involuntary AIDS Testing Statutes, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 369 (199 1)
(discussing the constitutionality of involuntary AIDS testing).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (incorporating the Fourth Amendment into
the California Constitution); id. § 19 (providing for an express right of privacy).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (approving and applying the two-prong test set out by Justice Harlan).
30. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
31. ld.; see id. at 772 (holding that under the facts of the case, the blood testing did not constitute an
unreasonable search).
32. For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has made this distinction and declared that
administrative searches lack the traditional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, see O'Conner v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987); Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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include searches conducted for the purpose of regulating public health and
safety.33 As Chapter 708 is aimed at public safety' and not at criminal
investigations, a search conducted pursuant to its provisions would likely be
considered an administrative search. In O'Conner v. Ortega,35 the Court restated
the test used in Camara v. Municipal Court36 to determine the reasonableness of
a search pursuant to an administrative investigation? 7 The test requires a
balancing of the government interest and the intrusion on the individual. 8
In the interests of public health and safety, the Supreme Court has upheld
mandatory drug and alcohol testing of employees.39 In Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n,4 the Court held that the mandatory testing of blood and urine
for the detection of drugs is not an unreasonable search upon railroad
employees.4 There, the Court held that the government had a substantial interest
in maintaining the safety of the railroads and that this interest outweighed the
burden of the drug test upon the employees.42 On the same day Skinner was
decided, the Supreme Court also held in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab,43 that mandatory urinalysis for the presence of drugs is not an
unreasonable search upon United States Customs personnel." As the Court
decided both of these cases in the context of the compelling government interest
of public health and safety, it is likely that Chapter 708 will be upheld for similar
reasons.
California courts have likewise upheld the reasonableness of an
administrative search where the government interest is the protection of public
health and safety.45 For example, at least one California state court has upheld the
reasonableness of mandatory testing of prostitutes suspected of being infected
33. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534; see id. (stating that a search for housing code violations conducted by
a state health department inspector is an administrative search).
34. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1239, at 4 (July 28, 1994)
(discussing the benefits of a health care provider learning the HIV status of a patient to whom he or she has
been exposed).
35. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
36. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
37. O'Conner, 480 U.S. at 724-25; Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
38. O'Conner, 480 U.S. at 724-25; Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37; see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691,702-03 (1987) (holding that warrantless searches of a closely regulated industry are not
unreasonable as long as the government interest is substantial, the searches are necessary to further a regulatory
scheme, the owner is advised of the search, and the searching officers' discretion is limited).
39. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
40. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
41. Id. at 602.
42. Id.
43. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
44. National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 677; see id. (stating that the government has a
compelling interest in safeguarding its borders; therefore drug testing is reasonable).
45. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1347,743 P.2d 1299, 1317,241
Cal. Rptr. 42, 60 (1987) -(holding that sobriety checkpoints are not unreasonable because the government
interest in maintaining safe roadways outweighs the intrusiveness of the search).
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with a communicable disease. However, another California court held that the
mandatory testing of persons arrested for violating an ordinance prohibiting
sexual intercourse in a hotel with a person not his or her spouse was
unreasonable.47
While neither the United States nor the California Supreme Court has
measured the issue of mandatory AIDS or HIV testing against the Camara
balancing test, other federal courts have encountered the matter.48 In Glover v.
Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardationy a Nebraska federal district
court held that where the risk of transmission of the HIV virus is extremely low,
mandatory testing aimed at maintaining a safe work environment is
unreasonable. ° However, in Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners,5 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a hospital's policy requiring an employee to
disclose the results of his HIV test.52 The Leckelt court, seemingly in the spirit of
the O'Conner and Camara balancing test, stated that the policy was justified due
to a strong government interest in maintaining a safe workplace. 53
The survival of Chapter 708 against constitutional scrutiny is uncertain. The
provisions of Chapter 708 will invariably be subject to the O'Conner and Camara
balancing test. Under this analysis, the government interest in maintaining a safe
work environment for health care providers and emergency medical personnel
will very likely outweigh the intrusive nature of the blood test.
Jonathan P. Hobbs
46. In re Clemente, 61 Cal. App. 666, 667, 215 P. 698, 698 (1923).
47. Exparte Dillon, 44 Cal. App. 239,243-45, 186 P. 170, 172 (1919); see id. (stating that there must
be some suspicion that the person to be tested is infected).
48. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 250-51 (D. Neb.
1988), affid. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs,
909 F.2d 820 (1990).
49. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb 1988).
50. Id. at 250-51.
51. 909 F.2d 820 (1990).
52. Id. at 832-33.
53. Id.
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Health and Welfare; physician assistants-dispensing drugs
Business and Professions Code §§ 3502.1 (new); 4051.6 (amended).
SB 1642 (Craven); 1994 STAT. Ch. 968
Existing law, the Physician Assistant Practice Act,' provides for the licensing
and regulation of physician assistants 2 and authorizes licensed physician assistants
to perform specified medical services Existing law also prohibits the furnishing
of any dangerous drug or device,4 except by the prescription of specified
1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3500.5 (West 1990) (providing that Chapter 7.7, commencing with
§ 3500 of Division 2 of the California Business and Professions Code will be cited as the Physician Assistant
Practice Act).
2. See id. § 3501(d) (West Supp. 1994) (defining physician assistant as a person who meets the
requirements of Chapter 7.7 of the California Business and Professions Code and is licensed by the Physician
Assistant Examining Committee); see also id. § 3519 (West 1990) (requiring that the Physician Assistant
Examining Committee issue a license to all physician assistant applicants who meet the following
requirements: (1) Provide evidence of completion of an approved program or medical school; (2) pass any
required exam; (3) are not subject to denial of license; and (4) pay all required fees).
3. Id. § 3502 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (stating that a physician assistant can provide medical services
set forth by the regulations of the Division of Allied Health Professions of the Medical Board of California but
may not perform services in the following areas: (1) Determination of or treatment of refractive states of the
human eye; (2) prescribing or using optical devices for ocular exercises, visual training, or orthoptics; (3)
prescribing or fitting contact lenses; or (4) dentistry or dental hygiene); see also id. § 3502.5 (West Supp. 1994)
(allowing a physician assistant to provide the medical services permitted in California Business and Professions
Code § 3502 during war or other emergency, without the physician assistant's approved supervising physician
available, as long as a licensed physician is available to supervise the physician assistant); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 16, § 1399.540 (1992) (limiting a physician assistant to providing only those medical services which she
or he is competent to perform and which are consistent with the physician assistant's education, training and
experience, and which are delegated in writing by a supervising physician who is responsible for the patients
cared for by that physician assistant); id. § 1399.541 (1992) (providing that pursuant to delegation, and
protocols where present, a physician assistant may do the following: (1) Take a patient history; perform a
physical exam and make an assessment and diagnosis from the exam; or initiate and revise treatment and
therapy plans; (2) order or transmit an order for various studies, therapies or procedures; (3) instruct and
counsel patients regarding their physical and mental health; (4) make referrals to other health facilities and
community agencies; (5) administer medication to the patient or transmit orally, or in writing on a patient's
record, a prescription from her or his supervising physician to a person who may lawfully furnish such
medication or medical device; (6) perform surgery customarily performed under local anesthesia; and (7) act
as a first or second assistant in surgery under the supervision of an approved supervising physician).
4. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4211(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining dangerous drugs as any
drug or device bearing the legend: "Caution, federal law prohibits dispensing without a prescription" or a
similar warning, or any drug or device that by federal or state law can only be dispensed by prescription or
pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 4240); id. § 4240 (West 1990) (authorizing the State
Board of Pharmacy to adopt regulations limiting or restricting certain drugs upon finding that unrestricted sale
is dangerous to public health or safety).
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professionals.5 Chapter 968 authorizes a licensed pharmacist to dispense drugs or
dangerous devices upon the order of a physician assistant.6
Chapter 968 provides that a physician assistant may provide medication to a
patient, or transmit orally or in writing a prescription from his or her supervising
physician to a person who may lawfully furnish the medication or medical
device.7 Prescription transmittal authority may be limited by the supervising
physician who delegated the authority Chapter 968 further mandates that each
physician who delegates prescription transmittal authority must have in place a
practice specific protocol and formulary.9 The physician assistant must base any
prescription he or she transmits on the protocol and formulary, unless the
prescription is based on an order given by the supervising physician for a
particular patient.10 Chapter 968 further limits a physician assistant's prescriptions
5. Id. § 4227 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (providing that dangerous drugs or devices be furnished only
upon the prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian); see also id. § 4036(a) (West Supp.
1994) (defining prescription as an oral or written order given by a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian
for a drug or device for specified individuals or an individual); id. § 4050 (West 1990) (forbidding any person
from providing any dangerous drug unless he or she is a registered pharmacist under the provisions of Chapter
9, commencing with California Business and Professions Code § 4000, or otherwise provided for by law); id.
§ 4050.5 (West 1990) (providing that manufacturers, wholesalers, or licensed public health laboratories are
exempt from California Business and Professions Code § 4050); id § 4051 (West Supp. 1994) (allowing a
prescriber, defined as a person who is a certified physician and surgeon or podiatrist and is registered as such
by the Medical Board of California or the Osteopathic Medical Board of California, to dispense drugs or
dangerous devices only if the following conditions are met: (1) The drugs are dispensed to the prescriber's own
patient and not furnished by a nurse or attendant; (2) the drugs or devices are necessary in the treatment of the
condition for which the prescriber is treating the patient; (3) the prescriber does not keep a pharmacy or drug
store of any kind; (4) the prescriber meets all labeling requirements imposed on pharmacists, as well as record
keeping and packaging requirements; and (5) a dispensing device is not used unless personally owned by the
prescriber); id § 4051.6 (amended by Chapter 968) (providing that a licensed pharmacist may dispense drugs
or devices upon the order of a nurse practitioner); 57 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 93, 94 (1974) (concluding that under
appropriate supervision by a physician, a registered nurse may assist a physician in the furnishing of drugs to
the physician's patients).
6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3502.1 (enacted by Chapter 968).
7. Id. § 3502.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 968); cf. MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 9E (West Supp.
1994) (allowing physician assistants to issue written prescriptions for patients); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.515
(1993) (providing that, with appropriate approval, physicians may delegate the authority to administer and
dispense emergency medications and to prescribe medications).
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3502.1(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 968); see id. (providing that the
supervising physician may specify the manner in which the physician assistant may transmit prescriptions).
9. Id. § 3502.1(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 968).
10. Id. § 3502.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 968); see id. § 3502.1(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 968)
(providing that at the direction of and under the supervision of a physician, a physician assistant may hand a
patient of the supervising physician a properly labeled prescription drug pre-packaged by a physician, a
manufacturer as defined in the Pharmacy law, or a pharmacist); id. § 4047.5 (West 1990) (mandating that
containers of prescription drugs contain the following information: (1) Name of drug and manufacturer; (2)
directions for use of drug; (3) patient's name; (4) prescriber's name; (5) date issued; (6) name and address of
furnisher and prescription number, (7) strength of drug; (8) quantity of drug; (9) expiration date of drug; and
(10) condition for which drug was prescribed); see also id. § 3502.1(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 968)
(prohibiting a physician assistant from administering or providing a prescription for Schedule II through
Schedule V controlled substances without an order by a supervising physician for the particular patient); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11055 (West 1991) (listing Schedule II controlled substances); id. § 11056 (West
Supp. 1994) (listing Schedule III controlled substances); id. § 11057 (West Supp. 1994) (listing Schedule IV
controlled substances); id. § 11058 (West 1991) (listing Schedule IV controlled substances).
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to a reasonable quantity consistent with the customary medical practice of the
supervising physician's practice."
Chapter 968 provides that when transmitting an order, the physician assistant
is acting as an agent of the supervising physician. t2 Chapter 968 requires that
specific information be contained on a transmittal order by a physician assistant,
including the name of the supervising physician." Chapter 968 further requires
that the supervising physician review and countersign the medical record of any
patient cared for by the physician assistant for whom the supervising physician's
prescription has been transmitted or carried out. 4
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The physician assistant is a category of health care professional developed to
help relieve the shortage and uneven distribution of health care services in
California. 5 The prescription transmittal authority granted by Chapter 968 is
considered to be critical in enabling the physician to fully utilize the physician
assistant and in making full use of the physician assistant's skill and training.'
6
Chapter 968 codified state medical board regulations which authorize
physician assistants to administer medication to a patient and to transmit a
prescription from his or her supervising physician, orally or in writing, on a
patient's medical record.'7 Chapter 968 goes further by authorizing physician
assistants to transmit an order on a prescription blank containing specified
information.'"
Bonnie M. George
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3502.1 (b)(3) (enacted by Chapter 968).
12. Id. §3502.1(c) (enacted by Chapter 968); see CAL CODEREGS. tit. 16, § 1399.541 (1992) (providing
that a physician assistant acts as an agent of his or her supervising physician); cf. Washington State Nurses
Assoc. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 605 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Wash. 1980) (holding that physician.assistants
act as agents of the supervising physician rather than as independent practitioners).
13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3502.1(c) (enacted by Chapter 968); see id. (requiring the transmittal
order to contain, along with the supervising physician's name, his or her address and phone number, the printed
or stamped name and license number of the physician assistant, and the signature of the physician assistant).
14. Id. § 3502.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 968).
15. Id. § 3500 (West 1990); see id. (declaring the legislative purpose in creating the Physician
Assistants position).
16. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS, COMMIFrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1642, at 2-3
(Apr. 11 1994).
17. See CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 16, § 1399.541(h) (1992) (providing that a physician assistant may
administer medication to a patient, or transmit orally, or in writing on a patient's record, a prescription from
his or her supervising physician to a person who may lawfully furnish such medication or medical device).
18. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3502.1 (c) (enacted by Chapter 968); see id. (requiring the transmittal
order to contain, along with the supervising physician's name, his or her address and phone number, the printed
or stamped name and license number of the physician assistant, and the signature of the physician assistant).
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Health and Welfare; propane distribution systems-safety inspections
Public Utilities Code §§ 4451, 4452, 4453, 4454, 4454.5, 4455, 4456,
4457,4458, 4459, 4460, 4461 (new); Revenue and Taxation Code §§
42000, 42001,42003,42004 (new).
AB 766 (Hauser); 1994 STAT. Ch. 388
Existing law defines a gas plant as all facilities for the production, generation,
transmission, delivery, underground storage, or furnishing of natural or
manufactured gas except propane for the purposes of regulation by the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).'
Chapter 388 requires that the CPUC conduct safety inspections for particular
propane systems2 to ensure compliance with federal pipeline standards.3 The
CPUC has the authority to assure compliance with federal regulations by adopting
rules and regulations at least as stringent or more so than the federal standards.!
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Prior to 1979, propane distribution systems were regulated by the CPUC.5
However due to the existence of federal regulations, the systems were
deregulated.6 Chapter 388 was enacted in response to recent explosions in
California that may have been prevented had inspections been performed to
ensure compliance with the federal standards.7
1. CAL- PUB. UTIL. CODE § 221 (West Supp. 1994); see id. §§ 301-325 (West 1975 & Supp. 1994)
(setting forth the provisions of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)); SNATE COMMII ON
ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, COMmrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 766, at 1 (Apr. 19, 1994) (stating that the CPUC
is responsible for regulating investor-owned energy utilities and that up until 1979, propane services were
regulated by the CPUC).
2. See CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 4451(b) (enacted by Chapter 388) (defining distribution system as a
system of pipes, operated by a person or corporation other than a public utility, serving 10 or more customers,
within a citywide area, an apartment house, a condominium, a cluster of homes, a shopping center, a
combination of the above, or a mobilehome park with two or more customers, that is connected to tank or
tanks, for the purpose of distribution of propane to the end customers); see also id. § 4452(c) (enacted by
Chapter 388) (exempting single customers served by single tanks; distribution systems, other than mobilehome
parks, that serve less'than 10 customers; recreational vehicles and appliances; vehicular fuel; agricultural,
industrial, and refinery systems where if commercial, it serves less than 10 customers; and cylinder exchange
operations from the CPUC safety inspection and enforcement program).
3. Id. § 4452(a) (enacted by Chapter 388); see id. (stating that on or before July 1, 1995 the
commission must undertake a propane safety inspection and enforcement program); see also id. 4451(g)
(enacted by Chapter 388) (defining federal pipeline standards as defined in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1688, otherwise
known as the Federal Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, and 49 C.F.R. § 190-192 (1993)).
4. CAL. PUn. UTI-. CODE § 4452(a) (enacted by Chapter 388); see id. § 4452(b)(1)-(2) (enacted by
Chapter 388) (outlining the authority of the CPUC inspectors).
5. See SENATE COMrIIEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 766, at
1 (Apr. 19, 1994).
6. Id.
7. See id. at 1-2; see also Catherine Gibbs, Claim Filed in Truckee Explosion, SAcRAINENTO BEE, May
21, 1994, at B5 (indicating that an explosion occurred because a leaky ball valve did not conform to an
applicable code); Ed Jahn, Building, Zoning Code Crackdown Angers Many Residents of Tecate, SAN DIEGO
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Chapter 388's opposition fought the bill arguing that programs of the
Division of Industrial Safety,8 the fire marshall 9, and the programs of the counties
and states were sufficient to ensure the safety of propane facilities'?
Marnie L Smith
Health and Welfare; redevelopment agencies-graffiti eradication
Health and Safety Code § 33420.2 (new).
SB 1515 (Hughes); 1994 STAT. Ch. 381
Existing law, known as the Community Redevelopment Law,' provides for
the establishment of redevelopment agencies2 to address the effects of blight3 in
UNION-TRIB., Apr. 30, 1994, at B4 (explaining that one California town lacks conformation with propane
regulations, among other things, because of irregular inspections). But see Jennifer Warren, Winter of
Discontent in the High Sierra, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1993, at A3 (indicating that at least eight people had died
in the winter of 1993 due to propane explosions caused by frozen propane regulators); cf Catherine Gibbs,
Delay in Fuel Plans for Truckee, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 2, 1994, at BI (explaining that propane systems have
regulators as well as tanks at residences and that both must be kept clear of snow and ice buildup which can
cause damage and possible leaks).
8. See CAL LAB. CODE §§ 140-147.2 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth provisions governing
the Division of Occupational Safety and Health); see also id. § 60.5(e) (West 1989) (indicating that the
Division of Industrial Safety has been abolished and the Division of Occupational Safety and Health is its
successor).
9. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13100-13135 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994) (outlining the
provisions governing the state Fire Marshall).
10. SENATE CONMreTF ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTaLxrms, COMMrirEE ANALYSIS OF AB 766, at 2
(Apr. 19, 1994).
1. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33000-33738 (West 1973 & Supp. 1994) (providing the
Community Redevelopment Law).
2. See id. § 33100 (West 1973) (establishing community redevelopment agencies); see also id. § 33020
(West Supp. 1994) (defining redevelopment as the planning, development, replanning, redesign, clearance,
reconstruction, or rehabilitation of a survey area, and the provision of residential, commercial, industrial,
public, or other structures or spaces as appropriate or necessary to the interest of general welfare, including
recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant to them); Pacific States Enter., Inc. v. City of
Coachella, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1414, 1425, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68, 73-74 (1993) (stating that when a dual capacity
legislative body is acting as both the governing board of a redevelopment agency and as the legislative body
of the community, the redevelopment agency and community are not one in the same governmental entity);
Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Cooper, 267 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75-76, 72 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (1986)
(stating that the elimination of blighted areas by redevelopment finds its constitutional basis in protecting the
public health, morals, safety and general welfare).
3. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West 1974 & Supp. 1994) (defining blight to include
areas which are predominately urbanized and hindered by factors which prevent or substantially impair the
economic viability of the area); Gonzales v. City of Santa Ana, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1335,1342-43, 16 Cal. Rptr.
2d 132, 136 (1993) (stating that redevelopment under community redevelopment law requires that the proposed
area be blighted); Morgan v. Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles, 231 Cal. App. 3d 243, 254-
58, 284 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750-53 (1991) (stating that if a community redevelopment agency and the city decided
that a particular area was blighted, the decision would be upheld on judicial review if it is supported by
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communities designated as project areas.4
Chapter 381 authorizes the redevelopment agency in a project area to take
any actions it deems necessary to remove graffiti5 from public and private
property, when it finds that the particular blight is of such magnitude that action
must be taken to further the objective of the redevelopment plan.6
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 381 is aimed at stemming the flood of graffiti." The blight caused by
the presence of graffiti detracts from the community's welfare and utility.8 The
Legislature maintains that the eradication of graffiti will add to the overall welfare
of the community.9 The gravity of the Legislature's concern in ending graffiti is
substantial evidence), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1476 (1991); Fellom v. Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco,
157 Cal .App. 2d 243,248,320 P.2d 884, 888 (1958) (stating that legislative decisions concerning the presence
of blight are not binding on the court, but should be given great weight by the court, and that courts should not
interfere with such legislative findings unless they clearly appears to be erroneous and without reasonable
foundation), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 56 (1958).
4. CAL HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 33000-33738 (West 1973 & Supp. 1994); see id. § 33320.1 (West
1973 & Supp. 1994) (defining project area as an area that is a predominately urbanized portion of the
community which is blighted, the redevelopment of which is deemed necessary to effectuate the public
purpose, and which has been selected by the planning commission pursuant to California Health and Safety
Code § 33322); id, § 33320.1 (West 1974 & Supp. 1994) (defining predominantly urbanized to mean that not
less than 80% of the community is in the project area); id. § 33322 (Vest 1973) (setting forth the process of
selecting a project area).
5. See CAL Evi). CODE § 1410.5 (West Supp. 1994) (defining graffiti as a writing which consists of
written words, an insignia, symbol, or any other marking which conveys a particular meaning); cf. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 145.60 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (defining graffiti in a similar manner).
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33420.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 38 1).
7. SENATE COMM=rre ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CoMMrrrE ANALYSIS OF SB 1515, at I (Apr. 6,
1994).
8. Id. at 2; see John Woolfolk, San Jose Tries Again to Control Graffiti Proposal to Make it Harder
to Get Spray Paint, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1993, at AI5 (reporting that San Jose spends roughly $100,000 per
year to clean up graffiti). Additionally, the story reports that Los Angeles incurs costs of $50 million a year
to remove graffiti. Id.; see also Jerry Gillam, Assembly Bill Would Make Graffiti a Paddling Offense, L.A.
TIMs, May 25, 1994, at A24 (stating that people's frustration with graffiti prompted the sponsorship of a bill
making graffiti an offense punishable by paddling); Lasers May Zap Graffiti, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25,
1993, at B3 (reporting that the State's frustration with graffiti is prompting the development of new
technologies aimed at removing the visual effects of vandalism); Mary F. Pols, New Business Can Semigloss
Over Your Graffiti Problem, S.EATrLTMs, Feb. I1, 1994, at B3 (stating that people are so tired of graffiti
that they are beginning to employ private companies to remove the blight from their walls, thus, being
individually compelled to incur additional costs).
9. See SENATECOMMrrE ONLOCALGOVERNMEwr, COMMTTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1515, at 1 (Apr.
6, 1994) (stating the legislative intent of increasing property values, as well as social welfare, through the
prevention and removal of graffiti).
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seen in Chapter 38 I's provision giving redevelopment agencies broad authority
to take whatever steps they deem necessary to stop its spread.'0
Christian A. Ameri
Health and Welfare; required emergency procedure information-
apartment houses
Health and Safety Code § 13222 (repealed); § 13220 (amended).
SB 1777 (Thompson); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1292
Existing law requires the owner or operator of any privately owned high-rise
structure,' any office building two stories or more in height, or any hotel or motel,
to provide persons entering those buildings with specific emergency procedures
to be followed in the event of fire.2 Existing law also requires that in hotels and
motels, the emergency procedure information must be posted in a conspicuous
place in every room available for rental, or provided by certain other means?
Under existing law, in high-rise structures or office buildings, the emergency
procedure information must be made available in an area of the structure which
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3340.2 (b) (enacted by Chapter 381); see Jeff Schnaufer, East
Valley Focus: North Hollywood; Grants to Help New Buyers Fix up Homes, L.A. TimEs, July 26, 1994, at B2
(stating that the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency approved grants of up to $7500 to first-time
home buyers). But see Jon. C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective
Zoning in Low-income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 754-55 (1993) (stating that despite the
elimination of blight being a noble goal, federal slum clearance and highway projects have resulted in the
uprooting of thousands of African-Americans, and has resulted in their relocation to segregated and inferior
areas); Richard Simon, Local Elections/LA. Mayor; Candidates Cultivate Fine Art of the Spiel, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1993, at A20 (speaking critically of Los Angeles' Community Redevelopment Agency, stating that
it has simply turned out to be a tax rip-off through the misallocation of funds on useless projects).
I. See CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 13210(b) (West 1984) (defining high-rise structure as every
building of any type of construction or occupancy having floors used for human occupancy located more than
75 feet above the lowest floor level having building access, except buildings used as hospitals).
2. Id. § 13220(a) (amended by Chapter 1292); see id. (mandating that the required emergency
information must include procedures for handicapped and nonambulatory persons); id. § 13221 (West 1984)
(requiring the State Fire Marshal to adopt regulations for the furnishing of emergency procedure information,
which may include the general contents of brochures, pamphlets, signs, or videotapes used in furnishing
emergency procedure information, but must provide for at least the following: (1) A reference to the posting
of exit plans for the structure; (2) a general explanation of the structure's fire alarm system; and (3) other fire
emergency procedures).
3. Id. § 13220(c) (amended by Chapter 1292); see id. (describing other means by which emergency
information may be provided, such as through the use of brochures, pamphlets, videotapes, or other methods
pursuant to regulations adopted by the State Fire Marshal).
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is easily accessible to all persons entering the structure.4 Any violation of these
requirements is a misdemeanor under existing law.5
Chapter 1292 adds the requirement that the owner or operator of any
apartment house two stories or more in height that contains three or more
dwelling units where the front door opens into an interior hallway or lobby area
must provide emergency procedure information to persons entering those
buildings.6 Chapter 1292 also requires that in hotels, motels, and apartment
houses, the emergency procedure information must be posted in a conspicuous
place in every room or apartment house available for rent, or, at the option of the
hotel or motel operator, or apartment house owner, it must be provided by certain
other means pursuant to regulations adopted by the State Fire Marshal.7 Chapter
1292 commands that the owner or operator of an apartment house, where more
than 25% of the occupants do not read English, is required to provide the
emergency procedure information in the language or languages understood by at
least 25% of the occupants." Chapter 1292 further requires that an owner,
operator, translator, or transcriber who provides emergency procedure
information in good faith and without gross negligence will be held harmless for
any errors in the translation or transcription of the information.9
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1292 was enacted in order to allow the dissemination of life-saving
information to more people while not overburdening apartment owners and
building managers."t The information required by Chapter 1292 can reduce the
4. Id. § 13220(d) (amended by Chapter 1292); see id. (directing that the emergency procedure
information be placed in an area of the structure designated pursuant to the regulations of the State Fire
Marshal).
5. Id. § 13223 (West 1984); see id. (declaring that any person who violates the emergency procedure
provisions, relating to hotels and motels, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction will be punished by
a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months, or both).
6. CAL HEALTHI AND SAFETY CODE § 13220(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 1292); see id. § 13220(e)
(amended by Chapter 1292) (providing that in the case of apartment houses as described in paragraph (a)(3)
of this statute, this section will become operative on July 1, 1995).
7. Id. § 13220(c) (amended by Chapter 1292); see id. (suggesting that brochures, pamphlets, and video
tapes are examples of means that are acceptable for the transmission of emergency procedure information).
8. Id. § 13220(b) (amended by Chapter 1292).
9. Id. § 13220(0 (enacted by Chapter 1292); see id. (noting that this limited immunity will apply only
to errors in translation or transcription and not to the failure to provide the information that is required pursuant
to this section).
10. ASSEMBLY COMMirrr ON HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, COMMTE ANALYSIS of
SB 1777, at 2 (June 15, 1994); see id. (noting that the California State Firefighters Association believes that
in the event of a fire or other emergency, persons who do not speak English deserve to have a chance to escape
to a place of safety); see also id. (stating that the Western Center on Law and Poverty has asserted that nearly
all of its clients are impoverished tenants who by necessity live in large, older, poorly maintained rentals which
too frequently are the site of tragic fires).
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threat of injury during an emergency situation, especially to visitors of the tenants
in such buildings."
The United States has consistently had one of the world's highest fire death
rates in the last few decades, and it is estimated that 6,000 people die yearly in
U.S. fires, while 60,000 are injured and require medical attention. 2 In California,
audits of Los Angeles apartment buildings were conducted after the 1993
Westlake apartment building fire killed ten people, and the vast majority of
apartments and residential hotels were found to be in violation of fire safety
codes. 3 As a result, lawmakers are beginning to focus on more effective fire
prevention measures while also realizing that an increase in civil tort litigation
cases has contributed to the trend toward implementing life safety and security
measures in residential buildings. 4 An array of statutes across the country
provides examples of the types of protections that legislatures can create in order
to save lives.'5
11. SENATE RuLEs Coimrrr, COMMIT'EE ANALYSIS OF SB 1777, at 2 (Apr. 28, 1994); see id.
(emphasizing that 10 people, mostly children, perished during the Westlake fire in Los Angeles and that
perhaps some of the panic could have been avoided if tenants had been aware of the emergency procedures in
advance of the fire).
12. Gina Kolata, U.S. Leads World in Fire Deaths; Experts Blame Ignorance of the Population and
Look to Computers as an Answer, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1987, at Z10; see id. (noting that fires cost the country
$30 billion a year and kill more Americans than all other natural disasters combined, and that fire injuries
typically necessitate an expensive hospital stay of one to two months for serious bums).
13. Robert J. Lopez, Audits Find Fire Violations in Most LA. Apartments, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993,
at 1; see id. (estimating that, based on inspections of 460 randomly selected buildings across the city of Los
Angeles, 70% of the multi-unit buildings were in violation of fire codes; 36% had not undergone the required
annual inspections; in areas with the most emergency calls, such as Pico Union/Westlake and South-Central
Los Angeles, the rate rose to as high as 68%; and firefighters in general needed more fire prevention training).
14. Allan D. Rosenberg, Life Safety Plans New Residential Priority; Life Safety Building Codes
Imposed on Commercial Buildings by New York, REAL EST. WKLY., July 7, 1993, at 18; see id. (stating that
cooperative and condominium boards and private building owners are being held liable for accidents and
assaults occurring in their buildings that may have resulted from inadequate security, maintenance, or fire
procedures).
15. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32001 (West 1994); see, e.g., id. (requiring every public, private, or parochial
school building having an occupant capacity of 50 or more students or more than one classroom to be provided
with a dependable and operative fire warning system); CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 13113.7 (West Supp.
1994) (mandating that smoke detectors be provided for all dwelling units intended for human occupancy);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-292(a) (West 1990) (requiring that the smoke detection and warning equipment
installed in residential buildings must be capable of sensing visible or invisible smoke particles); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (West 1986) (declaring that the destruction or defacement of fire warning notices or
posters is a crime known as fire prevention interference which can result in a fine of not more than $500, or
imprisonment for a period of not more than six months, or both); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 53A(a)(l)-(3)
(Michie 1993) (providing that fire safety information in hotels, motels, and lodging houses must state the
following: Locations of nearest exits and fire-pull stations; procedures to be followed when the fire or smoke
detector gives warning signals; and procedures to be followed in the event of fire or smoke development); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 477.150 (Michie 1994) (dictating that rooms primarily used for sleeping in hotels, motels,
offices, or apartment buildings must have posted in a prominent location an explanation of the route to use for
evacuation of the building); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 55:13A-7.7(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1994) (listing the information
that must be posted in hotels as the following: The location of the nearest exits and fire alarms; the procedures
to be followed when a smoke or fire alarm sounds; and the procedures to be followed in the event of fire or
smoke); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 378 (McKinney 1993) (discussing the standards for New York State's uniform fire
prevention and building code); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3781.10.4(A)(1) (Anderson 1992) (requiring smoke
detectors to be clearly audible in all bedrooms within the dwelling unit when all intervening doors are closed);
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Opposition to Chapter 1292 is based on the belief that requiring emergency
information to be provided in a language other than English, if a large number of
residents speak another language, may not enhance fire safety; some people who
are non-English speakers may not be literate in their native tongue, especially
recently emigrated young children.' 6
The California Apartment Association argues that Chapter 1292 will not
enhance or improve the safety of residents, but the foreign language requirement
of the law will instead present difficult, if not insuperable, logistical problems. 7
Joseph A. Tommasino
Health and Welfare; schoolage day care providers-education requirement
alternatives
Health and Safety Code §§ 1597.20, 1597.21 (new).
SB 1678 (Hart); 1994 STAT. Ch. 848
Existing law sets forth provisions for the licensure and regulation of different
types of child care facilities, including day care centers,' schoolage child day care
centers,2 and family day care homes.3 Existing law also sets forth the education
OR. REV. STAT. §479.080(1) (1987) (describing an electric red or green exit light, of a type approved by the
State Fire Marshal, that must be placed in full view of hallways showing the location of fire escapes); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-33-22.1 (1989) (providing that a conspicuous warning sign stating "In Case of Fire Do Not Use
Elevator" must be placed next to the places of ingress or egress to every elevator used for conveying persons
or goods in any building used primarily as a nursing home or as a home for the elderly and or handicapped).
16. ASSE4mLY COMITrrE ON HousING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, ComMrTrrEE ANALYSIS OF
SB 1777, at 4 (June 15, 1994); see id. (noting that some languages do not easily translate into other languages
and, thus, the fidelity of the translation may be in question); id. (questioning how the owner or operator of an
apartment house could perform an accurate survey of all occupants to determine their English language
capability for translation purposes); see also Gregory C. Parliman & Rosalie J. Shoeman, National Origin
Discrimination or Employer Prerogative? An Analysis of Language Rights in the Workplace, 9 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 51, 51 (1994) (stating that according to the United States Census, more than 31.8 million people in
the United States speak languages other than English, and this statistic represents a dramatic rise since the 1980
Census, which revealed 23.1 million non-English speakers). See generally id. (noting that, concurrent with this
rise in the percentage of non-English and multilingual speakers in this country, a growing trend that seeks to
preserve the English language has been born).
17. ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON HouSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF
SB 1777, at 3 (June 15, 1994); see id. (speculating on the potential liability of an apartment owner being
substantially increased as SB 1777 creates several new claims which may be asserted).
1. See CAL CODE REaS. tit. 22, § 101 152(d)(1) (1994) (defining day care center as any child day care
facility of any capacity, other than a family day care home, in which less than 24-hour per day non-medical
care and supervision is provided for children in a group setting).
2. See id. § 101452(s)(2) (1994) (defining schoolage child day care center as any facility or part of a
facility where less than 24-hour per day non-medical care and supervision are provided in a group setting to
schoolage children).
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and experience requirements that site directors, teachers, and staff of these
facilities must meet Chapter 848 provides site directors, teachers, and staff of
3. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1596.70-1596.895 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); see id. (setting
forth the provisions of the California Child Day Care Facilities Act); id. § 1596.81 (West 1990) (providing that
the State Department of Social Services must adopt any rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
California Child Day Care Facilities Act); CAL CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 102352(0(1) (1994) (defining family day
care as regularly provided care, protection, and supervision of children in the caregiver's own home for periods
of less than 24 hours per day while the parents or guardians are away); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1597.52 (West 1990) (setting forth licensing requirements for family day care homes); id. § 1597.52(b) (West
1990) (specifying that the provider of a family day care home must have at least one year of experience as a
regulated small family day care home operator, which can be waived if the applicant has sufficient qualifying
experience); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 101151-101239 (1994) (setting forth the licensing regulations and
general requirements for child care facilities); id. §§ 101251-101339.2 (1994) (setting forth the regulations and
general requirements applicable to day care centers); id. §§ 101451-101539 (1994) (setting forth the licensing
regulations and general requirements applicable to schoolage child day care centers); id. §§ 102351.1-102423
(1994) (setting forth the licensing regulations and general requirements applicable to family day care homes
for children); cf. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw § 390-a (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91 (Supp. 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.01.1 (Anderson 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 3502 (1991) (setting forth rules
applicable to child day care centers and promulgating the minimum qualifications required of staff of such
facilities). But see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.211(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (exempting certain establishments from
the requirements otherwise imposed on child care facilities, including boarding schools, nursery schools,
summer camps, hospitals, sanitariums, and homes which are conducted primarily to provide education,
recreation, medical treatment, or nursing or convalescent care for children); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §
3502(b)(1) (1991) (exempting facilities from day care requirements which provide care for children of not more
than two families other than that of the person providing the care); id. § 3502(b)(3) (1991) (exempting from
day care requirements day care facilities operated by religious organizations). See generally Pre-School Owners
Ass'n v. Department of Children and Family Serv., 518 N.E.2d 1018, 1025 (Ill. 1988) (holding that the criteria
determinative of whether staff at day care centers possess the skill and competence necessary to work
effectively with children are the regulations promulgated under the Illinois Child Care Act); 10 B.E. WrrxIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent & Child § 18 (9th ed. 1989) (discussing generally child care and
development services); Robert Rector, Fourteen Myths About Families and Child Care, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
517 (1989) (discussing the regulation of child care and the dangers that unregulated care poses to children);
Lori Baker, Who's Watching the Kids?, Untrained Day-Care Workers Put Children at Risk, Study Says,
PMOENIX GAZEMTE, June 24, 1993, at BI (stating that the majority of states have minimal standards, or none
at all, to regulate the training of child care workers).
4. CAL HEALTH& SAFETYCODE § 1597.055 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (setting forth the qualification
requirements for day care center teachers); id. § 1597.055(a)(1)-(3) (Vest Supp. 1994) (providing that a day
care teacher must have completed at least 95 hours of classroom instruction in child care and development and
child care occupations and at least 150 hours in supervised field experience in a licensed day care center or
comparable group child care program); see also George Tobin, Day Care and the Establishment Clause; The
Constitutionality of the Certificate Program in S. 5, the "ABC" Bill, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 317, 318
(1990) (discussing the Act for Better Child Care Services, passed by the United States Senate in 1989) cf. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1989) (providing that the Commission for Health Services must adopt standards to
establish minimum qualifications for operators, supervisors, caregivers, and other staff who have direct contact
with the children); id. (providing that these standards must reflect training, experience, education, or
credentialing and must be appropriate for the size of the facility being operated); id. (stating that the intent of
imposing requirements for minimum qualifications for day care workers is to guarantee that all children in day
care are cared for by qualified people, and to recognize that qualifications for good child care may not be
limited to formal education or training standards). But see State Department of Social Serv. v. Emmanuel
Baptist Preschool, 455 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. 1990) (holding that the State may not impede the free exercise of
religious beliefs by enforcing the accreditation aspects of program director qualification rule against a church-
operated day care center). See generally Claudia Feldman, Who's Watching the Kids?; Lax Rules, Spotty
Oversight Open Door to Day-Care Abuses, HOuST. CHRON., July 19, 1992, at Al (discussing day care centers
in Texas and the regulations which govern them, describing them as substandard); Carin Rubenstein, Solving
the Day- Care Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at C2 (discussing day care in general and stating that in the
absence of any national day care regulations, each state must formulate its own licensing requirements based
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schoolage child care centers with an alternative means of meeting these education
and experience requirements.5 Chapter 848 enables site directors of schoolage
child care centers to substitute training hours for education and also sets forth
additional types of education that may satisfy the educational requirements for
site directors.6 Chapter 848 also provides teachers at schoolage child care centers
with an alternative means of meeting educational requirements, allowing for the
substitution of training hours for education! Chapter 848 similarly allows staff
of schoolage child care centers to meet requirements through training hours rather
than through education.8 Additionally, Chapter 848 specifies procedures for
processing applications from organizations already licensed to operate schoolage
on different factors, including teacher-child ratios, square footage in centers, and health and safety issues).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.21 (enacted by Chapter 848); cf OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5104.0l.l(B)(4)(b)(i)-(iv) (Anderson 1993) (providing that the child day care center administrator must show
the director evidence of at least high school graduation or its equivalent plus evidence of having completed at
least two years of training in an accredited college, university, or technical college, including courses in child
development or early childhood education, or at least two years of experience in supervising and giving daily
care to children attending an organized group program). See generally Baker, supra note 3 (stating that the
failure of states to require training for staff at day care centers is a national disgrace that has serious
consequences for the nation's future).
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.21(a) (enacted by Chapter 848); see id. (providing that the
State Department of Social Services must permit the substitution of 20 training hours for each required unit
of education); id. § 1597.21(b)(l)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 848) (providing that site directors may fulfill
existing regulations by completing nine core units or 180 training hours from the following: Recreation;
physical education; human services and social welfare; units earned toward an elementary or middle school
teaching credential; or early childhood education, child development, or schoolage child units); id. § 1597.21(c)
(enacted by Chapter 848) (providing that the State Department of Social Services must expand the list of
college degrees that satisfy current site director educational requirements to include degrees in recreation,
physical education, human services and social welfare, and education); cf. Feldman, supra note 4 (discussing
standards in Texas for site directors, which allow a 21-year-old with a high school degree and minimal
experience to qualify as a site director of a day care center). ,
7. CAL HEALTH & SAFET' CODE § 1597.21(d) (en'acted by Chapter 848); see id. (providing that a
teacher may substitute 12 units or 240 training hours in recreation, physical education, human services and
social welfare, units earned toward an elementary or middle school teaching credential, and e4rly childhood
education, child development, or schoolage child units); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1989) (providing
that the standards adopted by the Commission pertaining to training and educational requirements must include
a provision that these requirements may be met by informal as well as formal training and educational
experience). But see Baker, supra note 3 (discussing a national study on child care which recommended that
states require at least one three credit course for teachers in day care centers); id. (stating that university
graduates will look for employment in places other than child care centers because of the low wages earned
at child care centers and that people can earn more at McDonalds than in day care); Leah Y. Latimer, Who's
Watching Over the Children? Day Care Training Decried; Experts Decry Ignorance in Care Centers, WASH.
PosT, May 17, 1989, at C1 (discussing child care centers and stating that 64 hours of classroom instruction is
a shallow requirement in comparison to what experts say should be the standard training for those responsible
for the care of infants and preschoolers). See generally Nick Chiles, Child Care All Work, No Pay; Low
Salaries Push Teachers Out ofSystemi, NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 1989, at 8 (discussing teachers in day care centers
and stating that teachers are much more likely to take their degrees to the public schools, where they can make
more money and receive better benefits).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.21(f)(l)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 848). See generally Peter
Pitegoff, Symposium: Poverty Law and Policy: Child Care Enterprise, Community Development, and Work,
81 GEo. L.. 1987, 1898 (1993) (discussing the child care enterprise and stating that the quality of care for the
children substantially depends on the caregivers and on the quality of their work life).
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child day care programs for a license to operate such programs at a functioning
schoolsite.9
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
As the number of women in the workplace increases, the number of children
who are left on their own after school also increases.'0 Because of the prevalence
of children being left alone and because of an increasing reliance on day care
services, there is a need to relax the requirements in order to provide children and
their families with quality daycare. n Although there is a need to ensure that
individuals employed at day care centers have the appropriate qualifications,
including education and experience, there is also a need to ensure that standards
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.21(g) (enacted by Chapter 848); see id. (providing that the
Department has 30 days to make a final determination of whether to issue a license to operate the program);
id. § 1597.21(h)(1) (enacted by Chapter 848) (providing that if the department is unable to make a final
determination of whether to issue a license, a provisional license will be issued for a period not to exceed six
.months); id. § 1597.21(h)(1) (enacted by Chapter 848) (specifying that provisional licenses are granted only
after, inter alia, an on-site visit has been conducted and the fire inspection has been verified); Montessori
Schoolhouse v. California Dep't of Social Serv., 120 Cal. App. 3d 248, 256, 175 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18 (1981)
(holding that whether a facility is subject to the licensing provisions of the Community Care Facilities Act is
dependent on whether the facility provides the kind of services intended to be regulated by the Act); see also
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.73 (West 1990) (indicating that the purpose of the California Child Day
Care Facilities Act is to encourage the development of licensing staff with knowledge and understanding of
children and child care needs).
10. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1678, at 3 (May 31, 1994); see id. (stating that the
Children's Advocacy Institute estimated that there were 560,000 latch-key children between the ages of 5 and
14 in California); see also Mary Ann McGovern, Education and Care in Early Childhood, OECD OBSERVER,
Oct. 1993, at 21 (discussing the increasing numbers of mothers of young children in the labor market and the
impact this has upon their children and discussing the importance of educational programs for young children).
11. SENATE FLOOR, CommrrrEANALYSIS OFSB 1678, at 4 (May 31, 1994); see id. (stating that SB
1678 will facilitate schoolage day care programs in the hiring of staff with appropriate educational
qualifications for working with schoolage youth); see also McGovern, supra note 10 (stating that when child
care is publicly funded, well-planned, resourced, and regulated, its quality is higher and more consistent than
in some private arrangements where there can be considerable variations in quality); Rubenstein, supra note
4 (stating that the best day care centers not only limit group size, but also employ well-trained staff members).
But see SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1678, at 4 (May 31, 1994) (stating that those in
opposition to providing an alternative means of meeting requirements claim SB 1678 cuts in half the number
of child development classes a site director needs in order to understand age appropriate activities and
curriculum); Baker, supra note 3 (stating that it is very important for people to be trained before they start
working with children); Joseph Berger, Teachers in Day Care Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1988, at BI
(blaming unappealingly low salaries for the unavailability of teachers with full qualifications employed in day
care centers). See generally JUDITH BEREzN, THE COMPLErE GUIDE TO CHOOSING CHILD CARE (1990)
(providing questions to ask when picking a day care center for your child); Latimer, supra note 7 (addressing
a concern that requiring college credentials or other specific educational training may alienate a lot of people
from the profession who have something to offer children).
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for such positions are not set so high as to preclude children from receiving the
care that they deserve.'2
Laura J. Fowler
Health and Welfare; tobacco sales to minors
Business and Professions Code §§ 22950, 22951, 22952, 22953, 22954,
22955, 22956, 22957, 22958, 22959 (new); Health and Safety Code §
216 (amended).
SB 1927 (Hayden); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1009
Existing state law prohibits the sale of tobacco to persons under eighteen
years of age and provides that violations are punishable by either civil or criminal
penalties.' Existing federal law states that in order to receive federal grants for the
treatment and prevention of substance abuse, states must enforce laws prohibiting
the sale of tobacco to minors.2 Existing state law also provides for inspectors,
acting as peace officers,3 to enforce certain provisions regulating food and drugs.
Chapter 1009 makes a legislative finding that the illegal purchase and
consumption of tobacco products by minors must be reduced and eventually
eliminated. Chapter 1009 provides that the State Department of Health Services
(DHS)6 must develop a program to reduce the availability of tobacco products to
minors.' As part of this program, the DHS must establish requirements that
retailers of tobacco products post a notice stating that it is illegal for persons
12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.20 (enacted by Chapter 848); see id. (stating that there is a
critical shortage of before and after school programs serving children); see also Rubenstein, supra note 4
(stating that California is known for supporting high-quality day-care centers).
1. CAL PENALCODE § 308(a) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (stating that violations are subject to criminal
action as misdemeanors or civil actions punishable by a fine of $200 for the first offense, $500 for the second
offense, and $1000 for the third offense); see also id. § 19 (West 1988) (setting the maximum punishment for
a misdemeanor at six months imprisonment and/or a $1000 fine).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-26 (vest Supp. 1994); see id. § 300x-21 (Vest Supp. 1994) (setting forth the
formula to determine the amount of the federal grant).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.3(f) (West Supp. 1994) (establishing and defining peace officers for
food and drug investigations); see also id. § 13510.5 (Vest Supp. 1994) (setting forth the minimum standards
for specified peace officers). See generally id. § 7(8) (Vest 1988) (defining peace officers generally).
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 216 (amended by Chapter 1009).
5. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22951 (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. § 22950 (enacted by Chapter
1009) (establishing the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement (STAKE) Act).
6. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 200-223 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth the general
powers of the DHS).
7. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22952(a) (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. (requiring that the program
be in effect by July 1, 1995).
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under eighteen years of age to purchase tobacco products. 8 Additionally, the DHS
must conduct random on-site sting inspections of retail stores that sell tobacco
products.9 Chapter 1009 also requires that cigarette or tobacco product dis-
tributors and wholesalers annually provide the DHS with a list of all names and
addresses of the persons to whom they provide tobacco and that cigarette vending
machine operators provide the locations of vending machines.' 0
Chapter 1009 also provides that any person, firm, or corporation who
furnishes tobacco, cigarette, cigarette papers, or any paraphernalia used to smoke
or ingest tobacco, to a person under eighteen years of age will be subject to civil
penalties." The funds collected through these penalties will be credited to the Sale
of Tobacco to Minors Control Account (STMCA) 2 in the 1995-96 through the
1998-99 fiscal years, and to the General Fund of the State thereafter. 3 However,
all funds collected as civil penalties that exceed $300,000 within any one fiscal
year will be deposited to the General Fund. 4 Additionally, an annual sum of
$1,500,000 for the 1994-95 fiscal year and $2,000,000 for each subsequent fiscal
year through 1999 will be transferred to the STMCA from the Federal Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) grant.' 5
8. Id. § 22952(b) (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. (mandating that the notice be placed at the point
of purchase and that the notice state that the tobacco seller is required to check the identification of all tobacco
purchasers who appear to be under the age of 18 and provide for a toll-free number to report unlawful sales);
id. § 22956 (enacted by Chapter 1009) (requiring all retail tobacco sellers to check the identification of tobacco
purchasers who reasonably appear to be under 18 years of age).
9. Id. § 22952(c) (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. § 22952(d)(I)-(8) (setting forth guidelines for
conducting random inspections); see also Teens Smoke Out Illegal Tobacco Sales, SACRAMENTO BEE, June
3, 1994, at SC8 (describing a sting operation conducted by teens to demonstrate the ease of buying cigarettes
illegally).
10. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22954 (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. (stating that this information
will be deemed confidential).
11. Id. § 22958(a) (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. (establishing a schedule for the imposition of fines
for violations); id. § 22958(b) (enacted by Chapter 1009) (providing that a person, firm or corporation against
whom a civil penalty was imposed will not be additionally prosecuted under California Penal Code § 308); id.
§ 22958(c) (enacted by Chapter 1009) (establishing procedures for imposing civil penalties on a corporation
or business with more than one retail location); see also id. § 22952(d)(6), (8) (enacted by Chapter 1009)
(providing that defenses to any action brought pursuant to a random inspection will include failure to follow
the proper procedure for a random inspection and failure of the minor participating in the inspection to appear
as a person under the age of 18); id. § 22952(0 (enacted by Chapter 1009) (stating that all civil penalties will
be enforced against the owner of the retail business and not the employees).
12. See id. § 22953(a) (enacted by Chapter 1009) (establishing the STMCA within the State Treasury).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 22953(b) (enacted by Chapter 1009).
15. Id. § 22959(a) (enacted by Chapter 1009); see id. § 22959(b) (declaring that upon appropriation by
the Legislature, the funds transferred from the STMCA will be used to administer and enforce these
provisions); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 290aa (West Supp. 1994) (establishing the SAMHSA and setting forth its
organization, powers, and duties); id. § 300x-21 (,Vest Supp. 1994) (setting forth the formula for determining
the amount of the federal grant)
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Chapter 1009 also states that DHS agents enforcing the provisions of Chapter
1009 will be peace officers entitled to specified powers and immunities granted
to them as food and drug inspectors.' 6 Additionally, the DHS may enter into
contracts with local law enforcement agencies delegating the enforcement of
Chapter 1009.17
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1009 was enacted to comply with new federal law and to strengthen
existing law prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to minors."8 Currently, teens
have wide access to tobacco and teen smoking seems to be on the rise.19
Additionally, the cost of tobacco use is an enormous burden on society.20 By
reducing the availability of tobacco to minors, there should be a reduction in the
16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22955 (enacted by Chapter 1009); see CA.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 216 (amended by Chapter 1009) (setting forth the powers and immunities of peace officers acting as
inspectors of the Food and Drug Section).
17. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22957(a) (enacted by Chapter 1009).
18. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEESON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1927, at 4 (July 5,1994); see 42
U.S.C.A. § 300x-26 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring states to enforce laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to
minors or risk losing federal funding for the treatment and prevention of substance abuse); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 308(a) (vest Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the sale of tobacco to persons under 18 years of age); see also CAL
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22952(e) (enacted by Chapter 1009) (stating that the State Department of Health Services
is to be responsible for ensuring and reporting the state's compliance with federal law).
19. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, CoMMrFfEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1927, at 4.5 (July 5, 1994)
(stating that smoking among high school seniors has increased from 28% to 30% from 1992 to 1993 and that
studies have shown 72% to 76% of all illegal tobacco sales to minors in California are successful); see Jake
Doherty, Community News: Mid-City: Pico-Union; Survey: Minors Can Easily Buy Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 1994, at 7 (stating that in a recent survey, success rates for minors illegally purchasing cigarettes were
as high as 83% in some areas); Doug Levy, Lighting Up Young, USA TODAY, June 21, 1994, at ID (stating
that an estimated 3000 teens a day start smoking, and discussing the ineffectiveness of laws prohibiting sales
of cigarettes to minors); Teens Smoke Out Illegal Tobacco Sales, supra note 9 (stating that during a recent sting
operation, 60% of the stores approached in the Los Angeles region and 53% of the stores statewide sold
cigarettes to persons aged 13 to 17).
20. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrrEEON HEALTH, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1927, at 5 (July 5, 1994) (stating
that annual medical costs due to smoking total more than $3.6 billion in California); see Nation's Largest
Survey Shows California Kids Have Easy Access to Tobacco in Spite of Laws, Bus. WiRE, May 25, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Easy Access to Tobacco] (stating that a University
of California San Francisco study shows that smoking costs Californians over $10 billion annually in medical
costs and lost productivity due to death or illness).
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number of minors that become addicted, thereby increasing public safety and
reducing costs.2'
Jonathan P. Hobbs
21. ASSEMBLY COMirrTEE ON HEALTH, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1927, at 4-5 (July 5, 1994); see
Teens Smoke Out Illegal Tobacco Sales, supra note 9 (stating that a critical part of creating addicts is selling
cigarettes to minors); Easy Access to Tobacco, supra note 20 (stating that according to the Surgeon General's
report, a key method for reducing tobacco addiction is to restrict tobacco access to minors); see also SENATE
COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1927, at 2 (May 1I, 1994)
(stating that virtually the only people who ever begin cigarette smoking start before age 19); Easy Access to
Tobacco, supra note 20 (stating that 60% of smokers in the United States began smoking before age 14 and
80% began before age 18, and stating that young smokers are 15 times more likely to become users of narcotic
drugs); Growing Number of Teens Join the Ranks of Smokers (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 5, 1993,
transcript # 605-6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File) (stating that 90% of smokers today started
as teens, and interviewing teenage smokers who started smoking as early as the sixth grade; one teenage
smoker commented that he would quit "when I hit, like, 18 or something").
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